3Jane Lending

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

3Jane tracks two different receipts. During the current risk-off bootstrap, senior USD3 remains in Aave and is not exposed to merchant credit; junior sUSD3 is locked, first-loss capital exposed to merchant advances that are not prefunded by posted collateral. DefiLlama separately records about $10.0M top-level TVL and $65.0M borrowed, not $75M of depositor TVL. Rejected individually because one slug cannot honestly assign the off-chain-credit class to USD3 while obscuring that it is dispositive for sUSD3.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Publishes product-level TVL and liquidity for USD3 and sUSD3 and clearly activates or retires the planned phase-two senior credit exposure
• sUSD3 publishes independently audited borrower cohorts, concentration, delinquency, default and recovery history through a stressed cycle

The research file

Mechanism

USDC suppliers choose USD3 or sUSD3. Official current docs describe phase-one USD3 as fully backed by Aave/idle reserves and kept outside credit risk, while locked sUSD3 backs merchant drawdowns, earns unsecured-credit yield and absorbs first losses. Borrowing capacity uses bank, exchange and on-chain data conveyed through zkTLS proofs.

Control and operating evidence

3Jane defines underwriting models, borrower access, advance terms and the pool-wide parameters that cap merchant credit, total debt, utilization, rates, tranche ratios, locks and withdrawal windows. Its current global-config documentation says the protocol owner can update those values through setConfig and can pause the market. Those are direct economic and liquidity authorities that must be mapped to the live owner, signer threshold and any delay. Merchant credit is not prefunded by posted collateral. The legal-recourse documentation instead describes a security interest in purchased yield, UCC-1 perfection, pursuit of onchain, exchange and traditional assets, and eventual collection-agency auctions. Recovery therefore depends on off-chain enforcement and asset availability rather than an atomic collateral liquidation.

Exit consequences

USD3 redemption is on demand but limited by Aave liquidity during bootstrap. sUSD3 has a one-month lock and can redeem only unused junior-tranche liquidity; merchant utilization reduces cash available. Defaults consume sUSD3 before any future senior risk-on exposure.

Assurance, incidents and recovery evidence

3Jane publishes Veridise, Sherlock and Electisec reviews dated from August 2025 through May 2026. Those reports are useful for contract scope, but this memo has not reconciled every finding to the live implementation or verified that underwriting models, zkTLS inputs and owner-set parameters are covered. No seasoned cohort-level default, recovery or withdrawal-stress record was identified in the primary materials reviewed. That is not a clean-history claim: the protocol is young, collections may proceed through negotiated cure, UCC remedies, courts or licensed collection agencies, and realized timing and recovery can differ materially from contractual rights. A decision-grade file needs borrower concentration, delinquency transitions, write-downs, recoveries and cash available to each receipt.

Comparison and product-level decision

Bootstrap USD3 should be compared with supplying USDC directly to the named Aave market: both depend on Aave liquidity, but USD3 adds 3Jane contracts, owner-set parameters and a planned lifecycle change. sUSD3 should instead be compared with a named private-credit or off-chain-credit product because it supplies first-loss capital to merchant advances and depends on underwriting and collections. Direct Aave exposure does not inherit merchant defaults; a credit product does not become cash-like because its senior receipt currently sits idle. The aggregate slug is rejected until product-level records make those different claims, controls, yields and exits explicit.

Why the individual verdict is rejected

The current USD3 mechanism does not fit off-chain credit, while sUSD3 explicitly does. The aggregate slug lacks product-level TVL and would misstate either side if forced into one class. Review requires separate USD3 and sUSD3 records plus proof when any planned phase-two senior credit exposure actually activates.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• 3Jane — protocol and credit-proof overview · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: zero-collateral credit, zkTLS data, USD3, merchant borrowers
• 3Jane — protocol white paper · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: Aave idle capital, senior claim, sUSD3 first loss, reserve-limited withdrawal
• 3Jane — Advance Agreement · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: merchant payment obligations, advance terms, off-chain enforcement
• 3Jane Docs — current supplier bootstrap phases · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: USD3 risk-off phase, sUSD3 credit exposure, one-month lock, redemption liquidity
• 3Jane Docs — protocol global configuration · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: owner setConfig authority, market pause, debt and utilization caps, tranche and withdrawal parameters
• 3Jane Docs — audit inventory · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: Veridise review, Sherlock reviews, Electisec reviews, audit dates
• 3Jane Docs — merchant default legal recourse · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: UCC-1 security interest, court enforcement, collection-agency auction, recovery paths
• DefiLlama — 3Jane survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: top-level TVL, borrowed amount, Ethereum deployment, uncollateralized-lending category

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.