Alandale V2

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

Alandale V2 is rejected under the version-1 AMM-liquidity-provision dossier. The live yield feed showed one WETH-LUTE pool with roughly $24,000 and a reward-driven APY above 300%. Alandale V2 is a ve(3,3) AMM in which LPs supply paired inventory while LUTE emissions and voter-directed incentives supplement trading fees. This is a protocol-specific application of a published class rule, not an unsupported claim that every contract or operator behind Alandale V2 is defective.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Alandale V2 ships a single-asset product with no AMM inventory exposure
• A client mandate explicitly authorizes market making with token, loss, and exit limits

The research file

Mechanism and applicability

Alandale V2 is a ve(3,3) AMM in which LPs supply paired inventory while LUTE emissions and voter-directed incentives supplement trading fees. The reviewed deployment therefore satisfies the dossier’s mechanism requirements on its own facts. The live yield feed showed one WETH-LUTE pool with roughly $24,000 and a reward-driven APY above 300%. A class application records enough protocol evidence to prove applicability while leaving the shared economic argument in the pinned dossier rather than pretending this is a separate flagship review.

Control and incident boundary

DefiLlama supplied no site, completed audit, or operator-control record; Robinhood Chain adds a single sequencer and Security Council beneath the venue. Those controls and the available incident record may change operational risk, but they do not remove the property that triggers this disposition. No clean-record claim is used as proof of safety: a young deployment can have little adversarial history, and an established deployment can execute its intended economics without an exploit while still remaining unsuitable for the advised sleeve.

Exit and current measurement

The LP exits into the pool ratio available at withdrawal, while the small denominator and emission-heavy rate make both valuation and proposed-size execution unusually fragile. Aggregate TVL is an accounting measure rather than a promise that the exact client position can be unwound at the displayed value. The disposition remains a zero allocation until a stated reopen condition is observed and a new review measures the proposed-size exit instead of inferring it from a dashboard total.

Comparison and decision

The already reviewed Alandale V3 reaches the same AMM conclusion; version labels change contracts and range mechanics but not the paired-inventory exposure. The comparison is made at the exposure level, not by brand or headline rate. The published dossier is preferable to repeating the same class judgment with slightly different wording for every venue; the protocol-specific sources retained here make the classification reproducible and the reopen criteria observable.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• Robinhood Chain Documentation — governance · primary · accessed 2026-08-19
  Supports: Security Council, upgrade delay, validator set
• DefiLlama — Alandale V2 protocol data · secondary · accessed 2026-08-19
  Supports: protocol category, chain perimeter, current TVL

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.