Alandale V3

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

Alandale V3 is a concentrated-liquidity exchange on Robinhood Chain. DefiLlama first surfaced seven pools on 2026-08-14 with roughly $0.4M of aggregate liquidity; its protocol record describes a ve(3,3) design in which LPs earn LUTE emissions while veLUTE voters direct weekly emissions and receive fees and bribes. None of that changes the client exposure: a concentrated-liquidity provider chooses a price range, stops earning fees outside it, and is systematically left holding more of the asset that underperformed. The AMM class rule rejects that path-dependent loss regardless of the venue’s quality. The extreme displayed rates in the first survey, including a median above 100% and a maximum above 900%, are not evidence of durable return; in a newly listed sub-$1M venue they are evidence that emissions and thin liquidity dominate the screen. This is a class-rule disposition, not an individual safety finding about Alandale or Robinhood Chain.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Ships a product line without impermanent-loss exposure that merits its own review

The research file

The mechanism

Alandale V3 is tagged as a concentrated-liquidity market maker in DefiLlama’s protocol record. Liquidity providers supply two assets inside selected price ranges. Trades rebalance the position along the pool curve; if relative prices move far enough, the position becomes entirely the weaker asset and ceases earning fees until price returns or the provider repositions. LUTE emissions, fee sharing, and bribes change compensation and governance incentives. They do not remove the inventory loss built into market making.

The record and control surface

The venue entered the tracked yield feed on 2026-08-14 with seven pools and roughly $0.4M of aggregate liquidity. DefiLlama listed no completed audits and supplied no protocol website in its metadata at review time, leaving contract ownership, upgrade authority, emergency powers, token allocation, and the identity of the operating team unresolved. Robinhood Chain itself is an Arbitrum-based Ethereum L2 with one Robinhood-operated sequencer and an eight-seat Security Council: routine changes require six signatures plus a seven-day timelock, while emergency action requires seven signatures and bypasses the delay. Those chain facts are inherited controls, not evidence about Alandale’s own contracts.

The exit

An LP exits by removing its current inventory from the exact pool and range it funded. That can crystallize impermanent loss and return a very different asset mix from the one deposited. Aggregate protocol TVL is not executable exit depth for a particular pair. The first survey’s small scale makes fee estimates, token prices, and displayed APYs especially sensitive to a few deposits or withdrawals. Assets bridged back through Robinhood Chain’s canonical Arbitrum route also face the standard seven-day L2 withdrawal challenge period.

Why the class rule decides it

Ketju does not recommend AMM liquidity provision for the mass-affluent diversification sleeve because the return requires selling the outperformer into the underperformer and because the loss becomes hardest to explain precisely when a client wants out. Alandale’s newness, missing audit record, thin liquidity, and emission-heavy rates reinforce the refusal, but they are not needed to reach it. Alandale can reopen the file by offering a materially different product without paired-asset or concentrated-liquidity exposure; ordinary growth of these pools would not change the class verdict.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• DefiLlama protocol record: Alandale V3, read 2026-08-14 · secondary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: DefiLlama protocol record: Alandale V3, read 2026-08-14
• DefiLlama yield pools feed, read 2026-08-14 · secondary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: DefiLlama yield pools feed, read 2026-08-14
• Robinhood Chain documentation: About Robinhood Chain · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: Robinhood Chain documentation: About Robinhood Chain
• Robinhood Chain documentation: Governance · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: Robinhood Chain documentation: Governance
• Robinhood Chain documentation: Bridging · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: Robinhood Chain documentation: Bridging

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.