CIAN Yield Layer
Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.
CIAN Yield Layer issues vault shares while a multisig sets fund-allocation ratios and moves deposits among strategy contracts that lend, trade, add liquidity, or use leverage. The August 15, 2026 survey reported about $261.9M across seven chains, so size no longer decides. The delegated-allocation rule is dispositive because strategy and venue weights can change after deposit without a client-enforceable approved-venue list. The record reopens only for a named vault with fixed client-compatible limits and continuously verifiable holdings, authorities, losses, and executable withdrawal liquidity.
- A named vault enforces an immutable or client-specific approved-venue allowlist and caps, with independently verifiable live holdings, authorities, losses, and stressed withdrawal liquidity
The research file
Mechanism and class applicability
A depositor supplies an asset to a Yield Layer vault and receives an LP receipt representing a pro-rata claim. CIAN documents a multisig-set allocation vector that transfers vault assets among strategy contracts; those strategies may lend, trade, add liquidity, lever or delever. Because the allocation and underlying venue weights can change after entry, the product directly satisfies the v1 delegated-allocation dossier.
Current observation and look-through
The DefiLlama protocol API read on 2026-08-15 reported approximately $261.9M TVL, concentrated on Ethereum and Mantle with smaller balances on Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, BNB Chain and Scroll. CIAN publishes vault and strategy contracts and an API with strategy weights, but visibility does not give a client authority to freeze the approved venues or their limits.
Control, loss and exit applicability
CIAN states that multisignature approvals adjust fund distribution and parameters and execute transfers between the vault and strategies. A vault therefore inherits each active strategy’s contract, oracle, leverage, swap and liquidity risks. Redemptions are requested on-chain and then handled by a RedeemOperator in batches; executable timing and proceeds depend on the vault buffer and strategies returning assets, while CIAN also charges an exit fee.
Why the shared dossier decides
Direct positions preserve explicit protocol limits and kill criteria; a CIAN receipt delegates continuing venue selection and portfolio weights to protocol actors. Reopen only for a named vault that enforces an immutable or client-specific allowlist and caps limited to approved venues, with live position-level assets, debt, allocation history, privileged roles, realized losses and stressed withdrawal results independently verifiable.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- CIAN — Yield Layer architecture and controls · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: vault shares, multisig allocations, strategy transfers, batch redemption, strategy operations - CIAN — Yield Layer contracts · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: vault contracts, manager, multisig, Aave strategies, Compound strategies - CIAN — Yield Layer API and redemption interface · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: ERC-4626, strategy weights, allocation detail, pending withdrawals, requestRedeem - CIAN — Yield Layer fees · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: performance fee, exit fee, NAV - DefiLlama — CIAN Yield Layer survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: current TVL, seven-chain perimeter, yield-aggregator category
Inherited controls
The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.
| Chain | Verdict | Grade | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Approved | sovereign | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus. |
| Mantle | Rejected | freezable | the team can push instant upgrades — there is no exit window a client could use. |
| Arbitrum One | Approved · limits | hybrid | a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock. |
| OP Mainnet | Rejected | hybrid | Ethereum forced inclusion limits sequencer censorship, but the Foundation and Security Council can co-sign an immediate upgrade before a client can exit. |
| Base | Approved · limits | hybrid | Coinbase — one regulated US company — operates the only sequencer, and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts within ~7 days. |