dTRINITY dUSD
Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.
dTRINITY issues dUSD, a stablecoin backed by yield-bearing reserve assets whose earnings are paid out as interest rebates to dUSD borrowers rather than to holders. At the 2026-08-16 survey the aggregated record held about $1.38M across Ethereum, Fraxtal, Katana and the related dS reserve on Sonic, under one percent of our $100M materiality floor. One practice advising 100 households moves $1M to $8M into a venue on the same research, and below $100M TVL that book becomes the exit crush. The file is rejected on size, whatever the design’s quality.
- TVL sustained above $100M for 30 days
The research file
Mechanism applicability
dUSD is a chain-isolated stablecoin backed at least one-for-one by whitelisted stablecoins, yieldcoins and some Curve LP receipts. Reserve float revenue funds borrower interest rebates and, depending on conditions, lender or LP rewards rather than accruing automatically to every dUSD holder. dLEND, sdUSD and external Curve positions are related but distinct claims. The aggregate measured reserve remains below the shared version-1 materiality threshold.
Current observation and perimeter
The DefiLlama protocol API read on 2026-08-16 classified dTRINITY dUSD as a Partially Algorithmic Stablecoin and reported approximately $1.38M: $0.85M Ethereum, $0.23M Sonic, $0.20M Katana and $0.09M Fraxtal. Current primary docs identify native dUSD only on Ethereum, Fraxtal and Katana; Sonic uses the related dS stablecoin. The registry records all measured chains while disclosing that the survey aggregate is broader than the dUSD label.
Control and exit applicability
Governance can add, remove or change reserve exposures and may pause minting, redemption and incentives if a chain reserve is undercollateralized. NAV depends on third-party and issuer price feeds, while reserve yieldcoins, Curve LP receipts and Katana bridge-backed assets add look-through dependencies. Eligible assets mint and redeem atomically at oracle value, but redemptions exclude LP receipts, require available reserve liquidity and may incur up to a 0.5% fee.
Why the class rule decides
At roughly $1.38M across four measured perimeters, a $1M advised allocation would approach the entire system before reserve composition, chain isolation or redemption liquidity can be stressed. The shared version-1 below-materiality dossier therefore decides. Reopen after reconciled dUSD and related-token TVL remains above $100M for 30 consecutive days, then separate each token and chain and review reserve look-through, governance and oracle controls, incidents, proposed-size redemptions, legal access and named simpler stablecoin alternatives.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- dTRINITY — dUSD reserve and redemption design · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
Supports: dUSD, chain-isolated reserves, Ethereum, Fraxtal, Katana, reserve assets, redemption fee - dTRINITY — protocol components and rebate flywheel · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
Supports: dUSD, dLEND, Curve pools, sdUSD, float revenue, interest rebates - dTRINITY — mint and redeem procedure · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
Supports: mint, redeem, chain-specific assets, reserve withdrawal, permissionless access - dTRINITY — Sonic dS reserve mechanism · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
Supports: dS, Sonic, reserve yield, borrower rebates, recursive lending, related perimeter - DefiLlama — dTRINITY dUSD survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-16
Supports: current TVL, Ethereum, Fraxtal, Katana, Sonic, stablecoin category
Inherited controls
The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.
| Chain | Verdict | Grade | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Approved | sovereign | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus. |