Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (ACRDX)
Plume Mainnet: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Base: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
OP Mainnet: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Solana: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint. An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder and claw back tokens.
Monad: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x8e68…24a4.
This file replaced an earlier version on 2026-09-27. Superseded to add control readings on chains the file listed without one, so a wallet holding the token there matches the file and the daily watch reads it. The terms and the claim model did not change. Earlier versions.
Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program and whether each household qualifies under these terms, and Ketju emails them when the file changes. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free.
The verdict is on the memo: Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (ACRDX) Not approved
Eligibility
Each answer quotes the issuer’s own words from the document named under it. Ketju reads each document again and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row states that.
- What the holder owns
A share of Anemoy’s BVI fund, which holds Apollo Diversified Credit Fund shares directly.
“The shares of the Apollo Diversified Credit Fund are held directly by the Fund”
Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · Overview · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
Non-US professional investors whose wallets Anemoy adds as members.
“Non-US Professional Investors”
Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Eligibility · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
500,000 USDC.
“500,000 USDC”
Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Min. investment · words found 2026-09-23
- Account types
The documents we read do not state this.
Not stated in Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain, Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, ACRDX fact sheet, June 2026 (linked from the pool metadata), Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and token compliance).
- Who it may be transferred to
The documents we read do not state this. Under the token’s transfer hook, only member wallets can receive it.
Not stated in Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain, Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, ACRDX fact sheet, June 2026 (linked from the pool metadata), Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and token compliance).
- How a holder redeems
Daily subscriptions; redemptions follow Apollo’s quarterly repurchase offers.
“Daily subscriptions; quarterly repurchases, subject to the timing of repurchases offered by the underlying Apollo Diversified Credit Fund.”
Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Liquidity tooltip · words found 2026-09-23
- Who keeps the official record
The fund issues its shares as the ACRDX token.
“The fund issues its shares as the ACRDX token to investors.”
Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · Overview · words found 2026-09-23
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
Centrifuge, the platform, states that frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens; Anemoy does not say so itself.
“Account freezing - frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens”
Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and token compliance) · Token compliance, Architecture · words found 2026-09-23
| Fact | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | issuer |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | reinvested |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
Who controls it
Ketju read these powers from the deployed contracts and their verified source code: the token and every contract it checks on a transfer. A power listed here is something the issuer can do; it does not mean the issuer has used it.
| Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Plume Mainnet | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Base | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| OP Mainnet | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Solana | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder and claw back tokens. |
| Monad | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | transfer hook 0x8e68…24a4 |
Who holds the keys
Ketju read every current holder of each power from the chain on 2026-09-27. A single key is one private key, and whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock delays every action, so holders can see it before it takes effect.
| Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Plume Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Plume Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Plume Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Plume Mainnet | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Plume Mainnet | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| OP Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0xdc94…235e |
| OP Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| OP Mainnet | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| OP Mainnet | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0xdc94…235e |
| OP Mainnet | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Solana | Mint authority | mint new tokens | an account only a program can sign for | 3JiU6s…oseb |
| Solana | Freeze authority | freeze a holder | an account only a program can sign for | 3JiU6s…oseb |
| Solana | Permanent delegate | claw back tokens | an account only a program can sign for | 3JiU6s…oseb |
Ketju could not read the role holders on Monad from the public event indexes on its last check. The table shows only what Ketju confirmed.
Ethereum: 2 contract reads, 5 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x423322445818be56f8a317adeba0bdb487b71608
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=false
- checkTransferRestriction in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- freeze in verified source 0x4233…1608
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- mint in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- file in verified source 0x9477…a74f
Plume Mainnet: 2 contract reads, 5 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x423322445818be56f8a317adeba0bdb487b71608
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=false
- checkTransferRestriction in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- freeze in verified source 0x4233…1608
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- mint in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- file in verified source 0x9477…a74f
Base: 2 contract reads, 5 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x423322445818be56f8a317adeba0bdb487b71608
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=false
- checkTransferRestriction in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- freeze in verified source 0x4233…1608
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- mint in verified source 0x9477…a74f
- file in verified source 0x9477…a74f
OP Mainnet: 2 contract reads, 5 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x8e680873b4c77e6088b4ba0abd59d100c3d224a4
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=false
- checkTransferRestriction in verified source 0x2fab…3245
- freeze in verified source 0x8e68…24a4
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0x2fab…3245
- mint in verified source 0x2fab…3245
- file in verified source 0x2fab…3245
Solana: 4 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- mintAuthority=3JiU6sJt94WcD6r7EFTUnJo6By9DJ9WJxovRGfY9oseb
- freezeAuthority=3JiU6sJt94WcD6r7EFTUnJo6By9DJ9WJxovRGfY9oseb
- permanentDelegate=3JiU6sJt94WcD6r7EFTUnJo6By9DJ9WJxovRGfY9oseb
- defaultAccountState=frozen
Monad: 9 contract reads, 12 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
- totalSupply()=0x0000000000000000000823246effeadda1b774a4
- decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
- eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- hook()=0x8e680873b4c77e6088b4ba0abd59d100c3d224a4
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=false
- codehash(0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245)=0x7a690cd1827d39a5081bb79eb527a2de7d86b0cb23dd4aa6f3d074db8109e2a3=codehash(1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f)
- codehash(0x8e680873b4c77e6088b4ba0abd59d100c3d224a4)=0x392e95d8ebc7585bfdc55e5c22312f5af9c07f3426222c708fab860ad2baed43=codehash(1:0x423322445818be56f8a317adeba0bdb487b71608)
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#checkTransferRestriction
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#detectTransferRestriction
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#messageForTransferRestriction
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.FREEZE_BIT
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.freeze
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.isFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.unfreeze
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#authTransferFrom
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#mint
- abi:twin:143:0x2fabf1c784b8583d63c00c5c9c0377d8cf1a3245=1:0x9477724bb54ad5417de8baff29e59df3fb4da74f#file
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| Centrifuge (Anemoy pool 281474976710664) | issuer primary |
Redemption
| Route | Settlement | Fee | Settles in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redeem with the issuer in its window | Daily subscriptions; redemptions only as the underlying Apollo Diversified Credit Fund makes its quarterly repurchase offers, paid in USDC through the Centrifuge vault | 0 bps | USDC, USDS, AUSD, USDT |
- Anemoy publishes the ACRDX offering memorandum; Ketju then reviews the file again for the investor class, the gates, and who keeps the register
- The FullRestrictions hook is replaced through file(), a freeze or authTransferFrom is used against a holder, or the Root delay changes
- Apollo Diversified Credit Fund cuts a quarterly repurchase offer, prorates tenders, or suspends repurchases
- A verified ABI for ACRDX on Monad becomes available; Ketju then adds that chain
- ACRDX holdings of Apollo Diversified Credit Fund shares fall below 90% of NAV
Daily checks
Every day Ketju reads each control function in the table above and the contracts the token checks on a transfer. Ketju compares the token’s on-chain supply with yesterday’s, and its market quote with yesterday’s quote, since a fund of this kind accrues a few basis points a day. Ketju also reads every document quoted above and reviews the file again if a quoted passage disappears from its document. Ketju counts a new, removed, or changed key as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change since yesterday. If the log does not show it, Ketju updates the key list in this file and does nothing more. A change opens a review before any client action. Subscribers get an email that names each of their clients who hold the token, with the household result.
File history
Ketju has revised this file once since filing it. Ketju keeps each earlier version as published, with the reason for the change.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Filed. |
| 2026-09-27 | Revised. Superseded to add control readings on chains the file listed without one, so a wallet holding the token there matches the file and the daily watch reads it. The terms and the claim model did not change. |
Sources
- Centrifuge pool metadata for the Anemoy Tokenized Apollo Diversified Credit Fund (pool 281474976710664), pinned by the pool on chain · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: issuer Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, non-US professional investors, 500,000 USDC minimum, quarterly liquidity, holdings as of July 20, 2026, service providers - Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, ACRDX fact sheet, June 2026 (linked from the pool metadata) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: BVI professional fund, invests in Apollo Diversified Credit Fund shares, 43M USDC AUM, fees, redemptions tied to Apollo repurchases - Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and token compliance) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: ACRDX contract addresses, account freezing, transfer hooks - Apollo Diversified Credit Fund prospectus · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: interval fund, quarterly repurchase offers - Verified FullRestrictions hook on Ethereum (Blockscout) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: members only, freeze, authorized transfer