Etherfuse Stablebonds (credit claims on sovereign bonds bought through Mexican brokers: CETES, USTRY, TESOURO, KTB, GILTS, EUROB)
Stellar CETES: can mint, change the code.
Base CETES: can change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Polygon CETES: can change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Monad CETES: can mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
This file replaced an earlier version on 2026-09-24. Superseded to settle the Monad powers the file had marked unverified. The Monad contract matches the verified Base contract apart from the LayerZero endpoint it was built with: it keeps no holder list, cannot freeze, pause, or claw back on Monad. Earlier versions.
Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program and whether each household qualifies under these terms, and Ketju emails them when the file changes. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free.
The verdict is on the memo: Etherfuse Stablebonds (CETES, USTRY, TESOURO, KTB, GILTS, EUROB) Not approved
Eligibility
Each answer quotes the issuer’s own words from the document named under it. Ketju reads each document again and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row states that.
- What the holder owns
A credit claim against Etherfuse MX on the nominal value of the bonds it bought with the holder’s money, paid out as yield and as the bond’s value at maturity. The holder does not own the bonds.
“grants the Customer the individual credit right on nominal value of the Securities that are acquired in the context of the preceding clause”
Etherfuse, Agreement for the Provision of Services and Commercialization of Tokens (plain text) · Clause Four, 4.5 · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
Non-US persons only, after Etherfuse’s own identity check; residents of FATF grey- and black-list countries are excluded.
“The Holder is not a U.S. Person as defined in Rule 902(k) of Regulation S”
Etherfuse, Terms & Conditions: U.S. Securities Law Regulations, Representations and Restrictions · Non-US. · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
The documents state no purchase minimum; Etherfuse’s Base guide advises selling at least about 50 CETES at a time.
Not stated in Etherfuse, Agreement for the Provision of Services and Commercialization of Tokens (plain text), Etherfuse, Terms & Conditions: U.S. Securities Law Regulations, Representations and Restrictions, Etherfuse: Stablebonds product page, Etherfuse developer docs: Base.
- Who it may be transferred to
Tokens move freely on chain, but only a new owner who has a contract with Etherfuse may claim the yield or the bond’s value.
“may be exercised solely and exclusively by the new owner of the Token who complies with the terms and conditions for maintaining a contractual relationship with Etherfuse® Liquid and Etherfuse®”
Etherfuse, Agreement for the Provision of Services and Commercialization of Tokens (plain text) · Clause Two, 2.4 · words found 2026-09-23
- How a holder redeems
Verified customers sell back to Etherfuse at NAV on any business day, paid in pesos or swapped for USDC.
“Stablebonds can be redeemed for fiat at NAV any business day. No lock-ups, no gates.”
Etherfuse: Stablebonds product page · Institutional-grade custody: Redemption · words found 2026-09-23
- Who keeps the official record
Each bond’s Solana mint is the Swiss securities ledger, and the holder’s entitlement comes only from it; the registration agreement does not name the Stellar or EVM copies.
“The entitlement to the securitized Instruments exclusively results from the Securities Ledger.”
Etherfuse (CETES) Registration Agreement, prepared by MME Legal (plain text linked from the token metadata) · Establishment (Errichtung) und effects (Wirkung) · words found 2026-09-23
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
No freeze or clawback on Solana or Stellar. The ledger administrator may pause all transactions during a technological change. On the EVM copies, a 3-of-5 Safe can upgrade the contract and pause bridge routes.
“The administrator of the Securities Ledger may pause all transactions related to the ledger-based securities in case of any technological change to ensure the functionality of the Securities Ledger”
Etherfuse (CETES) Registration Agreement, prepared by MME Legal (plain text linked from the token metadata) · Miscellaneous · words found 2026-09-23
| Fact | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | issuer |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | reinvested |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
What the issuer publishes
Ketju read these figures from the issuer’s own feed at api.etherfuse.com, as of 2026-09-24. Ketju reads the feed daily and sends an alert when the market quote moves away from the published NAV.
- CETES NAV 1.1823 MXN per token.
- USTRY NAV $1.0751 per token.
- TESOURO NAV 1.2585 BRL per token.
- KTB NAV 1.0151 KRW per token.
- GILTS NAV 1.0690 GBP per token.
- EUROB NAV 1.0299 EUR per token.
Who controls it
Ketju read these powers from the deployed contracts and their verified source code: the token and every contract it checks on a transfer. A power listed here is something the issuer can do; it does not mean the issuer has used it.
| Token | Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CETES | Solana | No | No | No | No | No | mint authority A6nFyQ…tHYP |
| CETES | Stellar | No | No | No | No | Yes | issuer GCRYUGD5NVARGXT56XEZI5CIFCQETYHAPQQTHO2O3IQZTHDH4LATMYWC |
| CETES | Base | No | No | No | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| CETES | Polygon | No | No | No | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| CETES | Monad | No | No | No | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can pause transfers. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
Who holds the keys
Ketju read every current holder of each power from the chain on 2026-09-24. A single key is one private key, and whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock delays every action, so holders can see it before it takes effect.
| Token | Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CETES | Solana | Mint authority | mint new tokens | a 1-of-2 multisig | A6nFyQ…tHYP |
| CETES | Stellar | Issuer account | mint new tokens | a single key | GCRYUG…MYWC |
| CETES | Base | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, pause transfers | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x14b9…27d7 |
| CETES | Base | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x3229…2ca8 |
| CETES | Polygon | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, pause transfers | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x14b9…27d7 |
| CETES | Polygon | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x3229…2ca8 |
| CETES | Monad | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, pause transfers | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x14b9…27d7 |
| CETES | Monad | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x3229…2ca8 |
Solana CETES: 2 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- mintAuthority=A6nFyQb2ywFZe23yEC4JQtLLe9aLXtt7EUAD8MFftHYP
- freezeAuthority=null
Stellar CETES: 4 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- auth_required=false
- auth_revocable=false
- auth_immutable=false
- auth_clawback_enabled=false
Base CETES: 3 contract reads, 1 function in verified source, 2026-09-23
- eip1967.implementation=0x39e85a42188060575b6ee77380fe1007c21b5988
- eip1967.admin=0x322922f0e1675a8e7be2a38b0636a7c184082ca8
- owner()=0x14b928243340033db1abad1adab4727c11d027d7
- upgradeTo in verified source 0x39e8…5988
Polygon CETES: 3 contract reads, 1 function in verified source, 2026-09-23
- eip1967.implementation=0x8a17c3830a8e77a5b2f9d9932b6e99ea5c8bcd5a
- eip1967.admin=0x322922f0e1675a8e7be2a38b0636a7c184082ca8
- owner()=0x14b928243340033db1abad1adab4727c11d027d7
- upgradeTo in verified source 0x8a17…cd5a
Monad CETES: 5 contract reads, 1 function in verified source, 2026-09-24
- eip1967.implementation=0xbb6e3bb8ec0ccaf523403bd5d35918b8a5de0d7c
- eip1967.admin=0x322922f0e1675a8e7be2a38b0636a7c184082ca8
- owner()=0x14b928243340033db1abad1adab4727c11d027d7
- codehash(0x834df4c1d8f51be24322e39e4766697be015512f)=0xbea7d6a3ec3c0b8a8438172d49b596f8a277166c16432eadaf2775c0a619593a=codehash(8453:0xc2c1f8eb98c0468be0232dd4166705d0dea3fe31)
- codehash(0xbb6e3bb8ec0ccaf523403bd5d35918b8a5de0d7c)=0x632abe88f8e7eb7bc671cf89cb067499719f2c9b5e37dc7d4ff8055d721ba8ff=codehash(8453:0x39e85a42188060575b6ee77380fe1007c21b5988)
- abi:twin:143:0xbb6e3bb8ec0ccaf523403bd5d35918b8a5de0d7c=8453:0x39e85a42188060575b6ee77380fe1007c21b5988#upgradeTo
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| Etherfuse app and ramp API (verified customers only; bought with pesos or USDC) | issuer primary |
Redemption
| Route | Settlement | Fee | Settles in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redeem with the fund at NAV by the daily cutoff | A verified customer sells the token back to Etherfuse at NAV through its app or ramp API and is paid in pesos to a registered Mexican bank account (CLABE). Mexico is the only live fiat rail; Etherfuse lists Brazil, Korea and Argentina as coming. Tokens held on Base, Polygon or Monad are bridged back as part of the sale. | 20 bps | MXN |
| Redeem with the issuer in its window | A verified customer swaps the token for USDC through Etherfuse’s swap service at a quoted rate. | USDC |
- The owner Safe 0x14b928243340033db1abad1adab4727c11d027d7 upgrades an EVM Stablebond, changes a LayerZero peer, or pauses a bridge route
- The Stellar issuer GCRYUGD5NVARGXT56XEZI5CIFCQETYHAPQQTHO2O3IQZTHDH4LATMYWC sets auth_revocable or auth_clawback_enabled
- The upgrade authority of Etherfuse’s Solana stablebond program changes, or a mint gains a freeze authority or permanent delegate
- Etherfuse replaces the customer agreement or a registration agreement, or names a different issuer
- The CNBV revisits Resolution P090/2024, or Etherfuse obtains a licence in Mexico, Kazakhstan or elsewhere
- An attestation report shows reserves below the tokens in circulation, or attestations stop
- Etherfuse opens the Stablebonds to US persons
Daily checks
Every day Ketju reads each control function in the table above and the contracts the token checks on a transfer. Ketju compares the token’s on-chain supply with yesterday’s, and its market quote with the issuer’s published NAV. Ketju also reads every document quoted above and reviews the file again if a quoted passage disappears from its document. Ketju counts a new, removed, or changed key as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change since yesterday. If the log does not show it, Ketju updates the key list in this file and does nothing more. A change opens a review before any client action. Subscribers get an email that names each of their clients who hold the token, with the household result.
File history
Ketju has revised this file once since filing it. Ketju keeps each earlier version as published, with the reason for the change.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Filed. |
| 2026-09-24 | Revised. Superseded to settle the Monad powers the file had marked unverified. The Monad contract matches the verified Base contract apart from the LayerZero endpoint it was built with: it keeps no holder list, cannot freeze, pause, or claw back on Monad. |
Sources
- Etherfuse (CETES) Registration Agreement, prepared by MME Legal (plain text linked from the token metadata) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: issuer Etherfuse Liquid MX, S.A.P.I. de C.V., administrator Etherfuse MX, S.A. de C.V., Solana mint is the securities ledger under CO 973d, entitlement results only from the ledger, freezing n/a; administrator may pause for a technological change, issuer may migrate the ledger - Etherfuse, Agreement for the Provision of Services and Commercialization of Tokens (plain text) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: credit right on nominal value of the securities bought, funds received in administration, claims only by a new owner who keeps a relationship with Etherfuse, claim at maturity paid within 3 business days, KYC and FATF grey and black list exclusion, CNBV Resolution P090/2024; no CNBV supervision - Etherfuse, Terms & Conditions: U.S. Securities Law Regulations, Representations and Restrictions · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: holder is not a US person (Regulation S), company will not register a transfer that breaks the restrictions, one-year restricted period - Etherfuse legal overview: Asset Security · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: bonds held at BBVA México, Actinver and Kuspit, separation of assets under Ley de Concursos Mercantiles art. 70, unnamed third-party attestations - Etherfuse legal overview: Legal FAQs · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: Etherfuse MX incorporated 7 June 2023, reverse solicitation, Swiss registration agreement by MME Legal - Etherfuse legal overview: Stablebonds Overview · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: NAV claim, not pegged, fee 0.25% to 1.5% of yield - Etherfuse: Stablebonds product page · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: redeem for fiat at NAV any business day, five marketed bonds; chains - Etherfuse public API: GET /lookup/stablebonds · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: token addresses on every chain, supply and NAV per bond - Etherfuse developer docs: Base · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: offramp at least about 50 CETES on Base - Etherfuse CETES token metadata (linked from the Solana mint) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: registration agreement linked on chain, customer agreement linked on chain - Stablebond OFT implementation on Base (Sourcify exact match) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: LayerZero OFT; pause() blocks outbound bridge routes only, owner sets peers and rate limits