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Eligibility file · Money-market fund

Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), BENJI token

What the client owns
Share of the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund, a registered government money market fund and series of Franklin Templeton Trust (CIK 1786958); one token is one share. Issuer indirect: The token points at a record kept off chain; the transfer agent’s file governs and the chain is a mirror.
Who may hold it
US retail investors. First purchase $20. State coverage not confirmed by the issuer. The first purchase minimum depends on the chain: Stellar $20, Aptos $100, Base $100, Solana $100, Polygon $1,000, Arbitrum $1,000, Avalanche $20,000, Ethereum $5,000,000. Individuals use the Benji app and hold on Stellar in a wallet whose key the transfer agent keeps. The other chains and holder-kept keys are for institutions Franklin approves. IRAs and other retirement accounts may not invest. Franklin lists BNB Smart Chain for institutions and dates its launch to July 2025, and its contract page labels the fund token iBENJI. The current August 1, 2026 prospectus omits BNB from its chain list and minimums, so the web page and the prospectus disagree on which chains the fund uses. We have not verified the BNB minimum or the contract powers on BNB.
Who can freeze or claw back
Stellar: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A multisig can freeze a holder and claw back tokens.
Ethereum: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A contract can freeze a holder. A single key holds the role token owner key.
Polygon: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A single key holds the moduleregistry owner key.
Arbitrum: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A contract holds the moduleregistry owner key.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A single key holds the role token owner key.
Base: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. A single key holds the role token owner key.
Solana: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code. An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder and claw back tokens. A single key can change the code with no delay.
Aptos: can freeze a holder, claw back, gate who may hold, mint, change the code.
How a holder redeems
Redeem with the fund at NAV by the daily cutoff (14:00 America/Los_Angeles). Through the Benji app or the institutional portal only, at the next NAV the fund works out (hourly, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern); the daily cutoff is 2 p.m. Pacific. Dollars go by ACH or wire to a linked bank within seven days; ACH generally arrives in two to three business days. Settles in USD.

In plain words on RIADeFi: Franklin BENJI (FOBXX).

This file replaced an earlier version on 2026-09-30. Franklin lists BNB Smart Chain for institutions and publishes its fund token address. The August prospectus omits that chain. The new file records both sources and the gaps in the BNB terms. Earlier versions.

Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program and whether each household qualifies under these terms, and Ketju emails them when the file changes. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free.

The verdict is on the memo: Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), BENJI token Not approved

Issuer
Franklin Templeton Trust (Franklin Advisers, Inc., investment manager)
Registration
Registered fund (’40 Act)
Official record
Franklin Templeton Investor Services, LLC, SEC-registered transfer agent
Instruments
BENJI
Chains
BSC, Stellar, Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Solana, Aptos
Reviewed
2026-09-30
Next review
2027-03-28

Eligibility

Each answer quotes the issuer’s own words from the document named under it. Ketju reads each document again and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row states that.

What the holder owns

A share of a registered money market fund. Franklin calls each share a BENJI token.

“Fund shares, or BENJI tokens, are offered without a sales charge.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Prospectus, Your Account, ”Buying Shares” · words found 2026-09-23

Who may hold it

U.S. residents where the fund may be sold in their state. With very limited exceptions it is not offered elsewhere.

“The Fund and other Franklin Templeton funds are intended for sale to residents of the United States, and, with very limited exceptions, are not registered or otherwise offered for sale in other jurisdictions.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Prospectus, Your Account, ”Buying Shares”, after the network minimums · words found 2026-09-23

First purchase minimum

$20 for most accounts, which means Stellar; each other chain has a higher first-purchase minimum, up to $5,000,000 on Ethereum.

“The minimum initial purchase for most accounts is $20, although you may be subject to a higher investment minimum.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Fund summary, ”Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares” · words found 2026-09-23

Account types

Individuals through the app and institutions through the portal. IRAs, Roth IRAs, and employer retirement plans may not invest.

“The Fund does not permit investments by employer sponsored retirement plans, SIMPLE-IRAs, SEP-IRAs, SARSEPs or 403(b) plan accounts, IRAs, IRA Rollovers, Coverdale Education Savings Plans or Roth IRAs.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Prospectus, Your Account, ”Buying Shares” · words found 2026-09-23

Who it may be transferred to

Holder to holder, at any hour, but only between wallets the transfer agent has whitelisted.

“Before transferring Fund shares, you (as the transferor) and the potential transferee must each have an active, permissioned (i.e., “whitelisted”) wallet registered with the Fund’s transfer agent on any approved blockchain network.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Prospectus, Your Account, ”Peer-to-Peer Transfer of Shares” · words found 2026-09-23

How a holder redeems

Through the app or portal only, for dollars to a linked bank account, within seven days; ACH generally arrives in two to three business days.

“Redemption proceeds will be sent by electronic funds transfer (ACH or Fed Wire) from your App or Institutional Web Portal account to your bank account within seven days after we receive your request in proper form.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Prospectus, Your Account, ”Selling Shares” · words found 2026-09-23

Who keeps the official record

Franklin Templeton Investor Services, the transfer agent, keeps the official record in a system that joins its own database to the chains.

“The Fund’s transfer agent maintains the official record of share ownership via a proprietary blockchain-integrated system that utilizes features of traditional book-entry form and one or more public blockchain networks.”

SEC EDGAR: Franklin Templeton Trust Form N-1A post-effective amendment 11 (485BPOS), prospectus and SAI effective August 1, 2026 · Fund summary, ”Use of Blockchain” · words found 2026-09-23

What the issuer says it can freeze or take back

The transfer agent holds separate administrative keys that can correct, freeze, move, or restore any holder’s record, whoever holds the wallet key.

“The Administrative Controls permit FTIS to maintain, correct, freeze, migrate, or restore the official record of share ownership in the Integrated System.”

SEC Division of Investment Management, staff no-action letter to Franklin Templeton (Aug. 12, 2026) · SEC staff response, Background · words found 2026-09-23

FactAnswer
Who onboards the holderissuer
Voting rightsYes
Distributionsnew tokens
SIPC coverage of the walletNo

The transfer agent’s SEC record

A transfer agent registers with the SEC on Form TA-1 and reports each year on Form TA-2: how many securityholder accounts it keeps and for how many issues it keeps the master securityholder file, the list that says who owns each share.

AgentSEC fileOn EDGAR sinceTA-2 periodAccountsIssues with master fileWork it hires out
FRANKLIN TEMPLETON INVESTOR SERVICES LLC /TA084-010362002-12-262025-12-311,2181FIS Investor Services LLC

Who controls it

Ketju read these powers from the deployed contracts and their verified source code: the token and every contract it checks on a transfer. A power listed here is something the issuer can do; it does not mean the issuer has used it.

ChainFreeze a holderPauseClaw backGate holdersChange the codeKeys held by
StellarYesNoYesYesYesA multisig can freeze a holder and claw back tokens.
EthereumYesYesYesYesYesA contract can freeze a holder. A single key holds the role token owner key.
PolygonYesYesYesYesYesA single key holds the moduleregistry owner key.
ArbitrumYesYesYesYesYesA contract holds the moduleregistry owner key.
AvalancheYesYesYesYesYesA single key holds the role token owner key.
BaseYesYesYesYesYesA single key holds the role token owner key.
SolanaYesNoYesYesYesAn account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder and claw back tokens. A single key can change the code with no delay.
AptosYesNoYesYesYes0x4705f33d665762a5371d3b8786e63749814e749295ea73269b379c84b756d83a (mint_ref)

Who holds the keys

Ketju read every current holder of each power from the chain on 2026-09-29. A single key is one private key, and whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock delays every action, so holders can see it before it takes effect.

ChainKeyWhat it can doHeld byAddress
StellarIssuer accountmint new tokens, freeze a holder, claw back tokens, decide who may holda multisigGBHNGL…ZIW5
EthereumModuleRegistry ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
EthereumRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
EthereumRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
EthereumRole authorization admindecide who may hold, freeze a holdera contract0xa2bd…8b66
EthereumAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
EthereumAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
EthereumAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0x48a6…c1fc
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
EthereumRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
PolygonModuleRegistry ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x8eed…00ba
PolygonAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa single key0x8eed…00ba
PolygonRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x8eed…00ba
PolygonRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
PolygonRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
PolygonRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
PolygonRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xc69c…de8a
PolygonAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa single key0x8eed…00ba
PolygonRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x8eed…00ba
PolygonRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
PolygonRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
PolygonRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
PolygonRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xc69c…de8a
ArbitrumModuleRegistry ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xc5d3…30b6
AvalancheModuleRegistry ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xe4b2…7af4
AvalancheAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0xe4b2…7af4
AvalancheRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xe4b2…7af4
AvalancheRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
AvalancheRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
AvalancheRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
AvalancheAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0xe4b2…7af4
AvalancheRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xe4b2…7af4
AvalancheRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
AvalancheRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
AvalancheRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
BaseModuleRegistry ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xa490…e898
BaseAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0xa490…e898
BaseRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xa490…e898
BaseRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
BaseRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
BaseRole token ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
BaseAdmin rolegrant and revoke these powersa contract0xa490…e898
BaseRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa contract0xa490…e898
BaseRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x42cc…a2d6
BaseRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0x64d4…23e6
BaseRole module ownergrant and revoke these powersa single key0xb671…b24f
SolanaMint authoritymint new tokensan account only a program can sign for5Tu84f…FxA1
SolanaFreeze authorityfreeze a holderan account only a program can sign for5Tu84f…FxA1
SolanaPermanent delegateclaw back tokensan account only a program can sign for5Tu84f…FxA1
SolanaTransfer-hook authoritydecide who may hold, change the codean account only a program can sign for5Tu84f…FxA1
SolanaHook program upgrade authoritychange the codea single keyAJyEpT…sXeJ

Ketju could not read the role holders on Arbitrum, Aptos from the public event indexes on its last check. The table shows only what Ketju confirmed.

Stellar: 4 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • auth_required=true
  • auth_revocable=true
  • auth_immutable=false
  • auth_clawback_enabled=true
Ethereum: 6 contract reads, 6 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • eip1967.implementation=0x20ca56f1215c3376b25bba1f2f9d3701c5def4c5
  • moduleRegistry=0xd7644d80575678c027ced844bbeef5ad12277d40
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_AUTHORIZATION)=0x55dd370dede1ad474d3543be06452615d3b5b162
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSACTIONAL)=0x648a6e41b4e445506b848ce49ffef827651ab4f5
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_INTENT_VALIDATION)=0xba5314385d4a849f8d8dbfb867b67547683f8a93
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSFER_AGENT)=0x8c8bfc3151c2161a4bad77268e246a08e5d9c666
Read from verified source
Polygon: 4 contract reads, 6 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • eip1967.implementation=0xc1df95cf7f96f020f511f2f03fbf6cc18f8464b2
  • moduleRegistry=0xc8cfac89e292a6486775fb86f789612bcc692c7d
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_AUTHORIZATION)=0x026d556acce6e9599ca6d85cd034f663f0ffe2bd
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSACTIONAL)=0x9119ead895210d841cb4f556248a3cc054294fb0
Read from verified source
Arbitrum: 4 contract reads, 6 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • eip1967.implementation=0x956a399818c7cbabbd0b868a60f61ec9027136cd
  • moduleRegistry=0xcb788286abca7b681feb056877b62c778f0a37df
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_AUTHORIZATION)=0xb1ef38b2ef8ffcffa70e41afad175e7bae15f517
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSACTIONAL)=0x9c012931e13f2546d64b75401fdf7eec6b651cbd
Read from verified source
Avalanche: 4 contract reads, 6 functions in verified source, 2026-09-24
Read from the chain
  • eip1967.implementation=0x5c118e6a0bd2de0af66655806e3001727c13d105
  • moduleRegistry=0x5bb59a51e1c469537eeab04af6b44c2e980fba5c
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_AUTHORIZATION)=0xdf67bf51f121297fcad7a65ccc98579b43ac6c56
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSACTIONAL)=0x9ac1580474da8c725735555036ebac9d486e47f3
Read from verified source
Base: 5 contract reads, 6 functions in verified source, 2026-09-24
Read from the chain
  • eip1967.implementation=0xab12adb95bbbb71007669cde208a0b1f89d1a101
  • moduleRegistry=0x59ecee0bb35a5355b0940280ca195cbc49e148be
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_AUTHORIZATION)=0x0a18c08dc0063e0d02a01675d782c119e8922fcf
  • getModuleAddress(MODULE_TRANSACTIONAL)=0x5ba6b6701266b17427c120d87dcb8cb82c07f8f1
  • codehash(0xe50ccb129a5beda051b759827c262dcacf097b8a)=0x00acad99a75c517ac72a92b790af745c6aecedbaff8c2f15ab9f507e42f820d6=codehash(1:0x555e4e69eeb9c26c9893bff40ba6c149cc2ee850)
Read from verified source
Solana: 4 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • mintAuthority=5Tu84fKBpe9vfXeotjvfvWdWbAjy3hqsExvuHgFqFxA1
  • freezeAuthority=5Tu84fKBpe9vfXeotjvfvWdWbAjy3hqsExvuHgFqFxA1
  • permanentDelegate=5Tu84fKBpe9vfXeotjvfvWdWbAjy3hqsExvuHgFqFxA1
  • transferHook=huk3EPrNreTdUUjVKVkGSGKF1WC4P9BiUKBkn2kFWnP
Aptos: 3 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-28
Read from the chain
  • refs=burn_ref,mint_ref,mutate_ref,transfer_ref
  • module=0xe10898758351ac7d32835ca8f7ef75a31232d210a1ba9cb628f85aef8a6f8eb6
  • upgrade_policy=FTFunds=1

Where it trades

VenueKind
Benji app (individuals) and Benji Institutional web portalissuer primary

Redemption

RouteCutoffSettlementFeeSettles in
Redeem with the fund at NAV by the daily cutoff14:00 America/Los_AngelesThrough the Benji app or the institutional portal only, at the next NAV the fund works out (hourly, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern); the daily cutoff is 2 p.m. Pacific. Dollars go by ACH or wire to a linked bank within seven days; ACH generally arrives in two to three business days.0 bpsUSD

Daily checks

Every day Ketju reads each control function in the table above and the contracts the token checks on a transfer. Ketju compares the token’s on-chain supply with yesterday’s, and its market quote with its one-dollar value. Ketju also reads every document quoted above and reviews the file again if a quoted passage disappears from its document. Ketju reads EDGAR for the transfer agent’s registration and reviews the file again when a new filing appears. Ketju counts a new, removed, or changed key as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change since yesterday. If the log does not show it, Ketju updates the key list in this file and does nothing more. A change opens a review before any client action. Subscribers get an email that names each of their clients who hold the token, with the household result.

File history

Ketju has revised this file 4 times since filing it. Ketju keeps each earlier version as published, with the reason for the change.

DateChange
2026-09-23Filed.
2026-09-24Revised. Superseded to record the Avalanche contract’s freeze and allowlist powers, which the file had marked unverified because the explorer did not answer. The reader now reads them from the verified source: the Avalanche BENJI contract can freeze a holder and limit holders to a list, as on the other chains.
2026-09-24Revised. Superseded to settle the Base allowlist and freeze powers the file had marked unverified. Base’s authorization module has no verified source there, but its code matches Franklin’s verified Ethereum module apart from its own stored address: on Base too, BENJI can freeze a holder and limit holders to a list.
2026-09-29Revised. The file listed BENJI on Aptos without a reading of who controls the token there. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding it now matches this file.
2026-09-30Revised. Franklin lists BNB Smart Chain for institutions and publishes its fund token address. The August prospectus omits that chain. The new file records both sources and the gaps in the BNB terms.

Sources

Every file is public. With a subscription, Ketju checks each of your households against the file and checks the file every day. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free. Start the trial.