Eligibility file · Commodity
XAUt0 (Tether Gold on the USDT0 Network)
What the client owns
XAUT (Tether Gold) locked one for one in the USDT0 OFT Adapter on Ethereum (0xb9c2321BB7D0Db468f570D10A424d1Cc8EFd696C); each XAUT is an undivided interest in one fine troy ounce of London Good Delivery gold. Not stated: The issuer’s documents do not say whether the chain or an off-chain register governs. The file records the gap and the date it was checked.
Who may hold it
Not offered to US persons. First purchase minimum not stated. The XAUt0 documents set no test for who may hold the token; the USDT0 site bars sanctioned persons and residents of places under broad US sanctions. The way out to gold runs through XAUT, which Tether Gold does not sell to or redeem for U.S. persons, so this file takes the stricter reading.
Who can freeze or claw back
Arbitrum: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
BSC: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Celo: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Polygon: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Monad: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Plasma: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Ink: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Hyperliquid L1: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0xb64a…c541.
Solana: can freeze a holder, mint. A 1-of-2 multisig can freeze a holder.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
BSC: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Celo: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Polygon: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Monad: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Plasma: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0x4dff…0bf8.
Ink: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay.
Hyperliquid L1: can mint, change the code (allowlist, freeze, pause, clawback unverified). Keys: owner 0xb64a…c541.
Solana: can freeze a holder, mint. A 1-of-2 multisig can freeze a holder.
How it exits
Redeem in kind. Burn XAUt0 on any chain through the LayerZero OFT route and receive XAUT from the OFT Adapter on Ethereum, which held 29,380.431 XAUT on 2026-09-23. The adapter sits behind an upgradeable proxy owned by a 3-of-5 Safe (0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8). Turning XAUT into gold or dollars then needs Tether Gold, on the terms in the tether-gold-xaut file.. Settles in XAUT.
Research and shelf status are on the memo: Tether Gold (XAUT) Adverse research finding
Who may buy, hold, transfer, and redeem
Each answer rests on the issuer’s own words, quoted from the document named under it. Ketju re-reads each document and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row says so.
- What the holder owns
A token minted one for one against XAUT locked on Ethereum. The documents do not say what legal claim an XAUt0 holder has.
“The original asset (USDT, XAUT or USAT) is locked in the OFT Adapter smart contract on Ethereum Mainnet.”
USDT0 docs: the USDT0 Network, lock-and-mint architecture · The USDT0 Network, “Lock-and-Mint Architecture”, step 1 · words found 2026-09-23
- What the holder owns
Tether Gold’s terms say a third party’s wrapped or bridged version of its token is not a Gold Token. The documents do not say whether XAUt0 is one.
“It is also possible that a third-party could create a Digital Token which claims to be an alternative version of Gold Tokens, such as by “wrapping” or “bridging” Gold Tokens. These Digital Tokens are not Gold Tokens.”
Tether Gold: terms text as served in the gold.tether.to site script · Gold Token Terms of Sale and Service, 4.11 “Risk of Wrapped or Bridged Tokens” · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
No holder test in the XAUt0 documents. Users of the USDT0 site must not be sanctioned or live in a place under broad US sanctions.
“You further represent that you are not (a) the subject of economic or trade sanctions administered or enforced by any governmental authority or otherwise designated on any list of prohibited or restricted parties”
Everdawn Labs terms of use for usdt0.to · Everdawn Labs Terms of Use, eligibility representations · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
The XAUt0 documents state no minimum.
Not stated in USDT0 docs: the USDT0 Network, lock-and-mint architecture, USDT0 docs: additional token behavior, Everdawn Labs terms of use for usdt0.to.
- Who it may be transferred to
Free on chain, except that an address the owner has blocked cannot send.
“Blocked addresses can’t send tokens, and blocked callers can’t invoke transferFrom or the EIP-3009 transfer functions.”
USDT0 docs: additional token behavior · Additional token behavior, “Compliance blocklist” · words found 2026-09-23
- How a holder redeems
Burn XAUt0 on any chain to release XAUT from the OFT Adapter on Ethereum. Gold comes only from Tether Gold, through XAUT.
“Tokens can be redeemed by burning them on any chain and unlocking the corresponding original assets on the Ethereum OFT Adapter.”
USDT0 docs: the USDT0 Network, lock-and-mint architecture · The USDT0 Network, “Lock-and-Mint Architecture”, step 4 · words found 2026-09-23
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
The contract owner keeps a block list. On the chains read here, the owner can also burn a blocked address’s whole balance.
“the contract owner maintains an on-chain isBlocked list”
USDT0 docs: additional token behavior · Additional token behavior, “Compliance blocklist” · words found 2026-09-23
| Fact | What the file records |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | No onboarding |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | None |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
Who can change the record
Powers read from the deployed contracts and their verified source: the token and every contract it consults on transfer. A power recorded here is the issuer’s ability, not evidence it has been used.
| Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrum | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| Avalanche | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| BSC | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Yes | owner 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Celo | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| Polygon | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| Monad | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Yes | owner 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Plasma | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Yes | owner 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Ink | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A 3-of-5 multisig can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A 3-of-5 multisig, through a contract, can change the code with no delay. |
| Hyperliquid L1 | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Unverified | Yes | owner 0xb64a…c541 |
| Solana | Yes | No | No | No | No | A 1-of-2 multisig can freeze a holder. |
Who holds the keys
Every current holder of each power, read from the chain on 2026-09-23. A single key is one private key: whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock makes every action wait, so holders can see it coming.
| Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrum | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, mint new tokens, claw back tokens, freeze a holder | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Arbitrum | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x553e…1b4a |
| Avalanche | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, mint new tokens, claw back tokens, freeze a holder | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Avalanche | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0xf8b0…cd80 |
| Celo | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, mint new tokens, claw back tokens, freeze a holder | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Celo | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x01bf…1071 |
| Polygon | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, mint new tokens, claw back tokens, freeze a holder | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x4dff…0bf8 |
| Polygon | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0xd949…0cb4 |
| Ink | Owner | grant and revoke these powers, mint new tokens, claw back tokens, freeze a holder | a 3-of-5 multisig | 0xc95d…dae2 |
| Ink | Proxy admin | change the code | a contract run by a 3-of-5 multisig | 0x5be5…d8b2 |
| Solana | Mint authority | mint new tokens | a 1-of-2 multisig | 9FJsE8…Y7Sy |
| Solana | Freeze authority | freeze a holder | a 1-of-2 multisig | 9FJsE8…Y7Sy |
Arbitrum: 3 contract reads at block 508156808, 3 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x9001dbe4d68d36ab87923a2a9dfb0c745fd25001
- eip1967.admin=0x553ec478a66be27ba25a6bc5db20aec2ed6a1b4a
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Read from verified source
- addToBlockedList in verified source 0x9001…5001
- destroyBlockedFunds in verified source 0x9001…5001
- mint in verified source 0x9001…5001
Avalanche: 3 contract reads at block 95987204, 3 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0xc6bc407706b7140ee8eef2f86f9504651b63e7f9
- eip1967.admin=0xf8b07fc6924b80e4792aca834309e03caf36cd80
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Read from verified source
- addToBlockedList in verified source 0xc6bc…e7f9
- destroyBlockedFunds in verified source 0xc6bc…e7f9
- mint in verified source 0xc6bc…e7f9
BSC: 3 contract reads at block 123585345, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x9151434b16b9763660705744891fa906f660ecc5
- eip1967.admin=0xedaba024be4d87974d5ab11c6dd586963cccb027
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Celo: 3 contract reads at block 78274885, 3 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x207059273474e6226a2e68085439015ad5fd7e4c
- eip1967.admin=0x01bff41798a0bcf287b996046ca68b395dbc1071
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Read from verified source
- addToBlockedList in verified source 0x2070…7e4c
- destroyBlockedFunds in verified source 0x2070…7e4c
- mint in verified source 0x2070…7e4c
Polygon: 3 contract reads at block 94313692, 3 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x6d205337f45d6850c3c3006e28d5b52c8a432c35
- eip1967.admin=0xd9492653457a69e9f4987db43d7fa0112e620cb4
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Read from verified source
- addToBlockedList in verified source 0x6d20…2c35
- destroyBlockedFunds in verified source 0x6d20…2c35
- mint in verified source 0x6d20…2c35
Monad: 3 contract reads at block 107351544, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x779ded0c9e1022225f8e0630b35a9b54be713736
- eip1967.admin=0xb8ce59fc3717ada4c02eadf9682a9e934f625ebb
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Plasma: 3 contract reads at block 33234724, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0xf555a12bffaef20cc201a74ae6513cb4aadb34b9
- eip1967.admin=0x779ded0c9e1022225f8e0630b35a9b54be713736
- owner()=0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8
Ink: 3 contract reads at block 56677249, 3 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x06d886ff518b5e642e7e6aad3ce797b7dabd8e9a
- eip1967.admin=0x5be536efb28c8efbd2da6894996f5df88347d8b2
- owner()=0xc95de55ce5e93f788a1faab2a9c9503f51a5dae2
Read from verified source
- addToBlockedList in verified source 0x06d8…8e9a
- destroyBlockedFunds in verified source 0x06d8…8e9a
- mint in verified source 0x06d8…8e9a
Hyperliquid L1: 3 contract reads at block 46684549, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- eip1967.implementation=0x4bb13347ce7cbf8884adb137aeda0355ef61b259
- eip1967.admin=0x6d205337f45d6850c3c3006e28d5b52c8a432c35
- owner()=0xb64a89ad247a2d691a728bb6822a85eedd7fc541
Solana: 2 contract reads at block 449737918, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
- mintAuthority=9FJsE8HkoJgxbbydk2R1Gc3hUruNJWwXR6AKYZWWY7Sy
- freezeAuthority=9FJsE8HkoJgxbbydk2R1Gc3hUruNJWwXR6AKYZWWY7Sy
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| USDT0 Transfer app (usdt0.to/transfer) for moving between chains, and DEX pools on each chain | dex |
How it exits
| Path | Settlement | Settles in |
|---|---|---|
| Redeem in kind | Burn XAUt0 on any chain through the LayerZero OFT route and receive XAUT from the OFT Adapter on Ethereum, which held 29,380.431 XAUT on 2026-09-23. The adapter sits behind an upgradeable proxy owned by a 3-of-5 Safe (0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8). Turning XAUT into gold or dollars then needs Tether Gold, on the terms in the tether-gold-xaut file. | XAUT |
- The owner of any XAUt0 token contract or of the OFT Adapter changes, or a proxy points at a new implementation
- An XAUt0 chain whose ABI is unverified here publishes verified source; the freeze and clawback powers are then read and the row updated
- XAUT held in the OFT Adapter falls below XAUt0 supply across all chains
- Tether Gold names XAUt0 in its terms, either as a Gold Token or as a wrapped token it does not support
- The USDT0 Network adds or drops an XAUt0 chain, or its DVN set changes
Reopen conditions: events that change an answer above
What the monitor reads daily
Every control function in the table above and the contracts the token consults on transfer; the token’s on-chain supply against yesterday’s; and its market quote against yesterday’s quote. Every document quoted above is re-read too, and a quote that leaves its document reopens the file. A change opens a review item in the governance queue and reopens the file before any client action.
Sources
- USDT0 docs: deployments API, XAUt0 contracts on every chain · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: contract addresses, OFT Adapter address, Ethereum source token - USDT0 docs: the USDT0 Network, lock-and-mint architecture · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: lock and mint, 1:1 backing, redemption by burning - USDT0 docs: additional token behavior · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: compliance blocklist, owner-held block list, upgradeable proxies - Everdawn Labs terms of use for usdt0.to · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: site operator, sanctions representation - Tether Gold: Gold Token Terms of Sale and Service, last updated 9 September 2025 (page) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: wrapped or bridged tokens, XAUT redemption terms - Tether Gold: terms text as served in the gold.tether.to site script · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: wrapped or bridged tokens are not Gold Tokens