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tokenized-rwa

GAIB

Rejected
Max sleeve
Reviewed
2026-08-14 · v1
Next review
2026-11-15
Chains
Ethereum · sovereign

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

GAIB separates treasury- and stable-asset-backed AID from yield-bearing sAID, an ERC-4626 claim on a managed portfolio of real-world AI-infrastructure financings plus liquid reserves. The DefiLlama protocol API read on 2026-08-15 reported about $20.1M of GAIB TVL, currently on Ethereum. Size is not the deciding rejection: sAID holders bear off-chain borrower, collateral, manager, valuation and delayed-liquidity risk, which is the exact exposure addressed by the shared v1 off-chain-credit dossier.

The research file

Mechanism and look-through applicability

GAIB documents AID as backed by U.S. Treasury and stable assets, while staking AID mints sAID, a transferable ERC-4626 share of AI-infrastructure financings and a stable reserve. GAIB says those financings commonly take the form of secured loans backed by enterprise GPUs, revenue-sharing agreements tied to GPU operations, or both. The yield-bearing sAID perimeter therefore looks through to private operating-company credit rather than inheriting AID’s cash-like reserve description.

Control and off-chain dependency

The sAID vault is operated by Spiceflow Company Corp., an independent third party responsible for portfolio execution and asset management. GAIB says financing deals are executed with off-chain AI infrastructure operators and proposes disclosures of operator identity, location, physical GPUs or customer contracts and estimated APR, plus third-party audit and underwriting services. Those disclosures do not make borrower books, collateral realization or manager execution permissionless or continuously verifiable on-chain.

Loss, valuation and reserve applicability

GAIB updates sAID NAV monthly and uses two exchange rates: staking NAV ignores unrealized losses, while unstaking NAV deducts them. Its own worked example shows impairment reducing unstaking NAV and a later default write-off reducing both NAVs. The protocol reserve is intended to absorb credit events and liquidity mismatches, but its use is discretionary and it may initially be funded by third parties; it is a potential buffer, not a guarantee against principal loss.

Exit applicability and why the class rule decides

Primary sAID exit uses a monthly FIFO Withdrawal Manager: requests are grouped for one month, liquidity is sourced during the next, and settlement occurs on the first day of the following month at the recorded unstaking NAV. A DEX sale can bypass the queue only at the prevailing market price, which may diverge from NAV. This combination of illiquid off-chain collateral, concentrated counterparties, loss-sensitive valuation and gated redemption is the shared v1 off-chain-credit dossier’s stated failure mode.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.

ChainVerdictGradeControl constraint
EthereumApproved sovereign No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus.
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