HypurrFi Pooled

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

HypurrFi runs pooled lending markets where users post collateral, borrow against it, and can loop the position to lever up yield. Its only deployment is on Hyperliquid L1, a chain the registry has rejected, so nothing it offers is reachable for client money regardless of how the markets are run. The settlement venue fails chain-level vetting before the protocol itself is examined. It held $5.8M across 14 pools at the August 14, 2026 survey. The verdict changes if the protocol deploys on an approved chain or the Hyperliquid L1 verdict changes.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Deploys meaningful liquidity on a chain the registry approves
• The Hyperliquid L1 verdict changes

The research file

Applicability to the surveyed record

HypurrFi documents an Aave-style pooled lending contract where suppliers receive interest-bearing hyTokens, borrowers post reserve collateral, and utilization, loan-to-value, liquidation thresholds, caps, and reserve configuration govern positions. Users can recursively borrow and resupply, but the shared rejected-chain rule decides before protocol-quality diligence.

Current observation and perimeter

The DefiLlama protocol API read on 2026-08-15 classified HypurrFi Pooled as Lending, reported only Hyperliquid L1, and showed approximately $5.72M TVL with about $2.44M borrowed. Primary smart-contract documentation identifies the deployment as HyperEVM and says its PoolAddressesProvider is owned by HypurrFi Governance, matching the rejected settlement perimeter.

Control and exit applicability

Governance-controlled roles can configure reserve collateral, oracle sources, caps, fees, activation, freezing, and pausing. Suppliers withdraw through the same HyperEVM pool and are limited by available reserve liquidity; borrowers and looped positions depend on oracle health factors and liquidation. No protocol action, secondary hyToken transfer, or repayment path routes around Hyperliquid L1 settlement.

Why the class rule decides

The shared v1 rejected-chain dossier controls because every pooled-market contract, oracle update, collateral transfer, liquidation, and withdrawal still settles on Hyperliquid L1. Reopen only if the chain receives an approved disposition or HypurrFi deploys meaningful, separately auditable liquidity on an approved chain; then review governance and roles, reserves and oracles, interest and liquidation parameters, audits and incidents, market liquidity, loop exposure, stressed withdrawals, and named lending alternatives.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• HypurrFi — pooled market contract · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: pooled lending, hyTokens, collateral, liquidation, reserve configuration, withdrawal liquidity
• HypurrFi — access control manager · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: HyperEVM, governance ownership, admin roles, oracle control, reserve listing
• HypurrFi — pool configurator · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: supply caps, risk admin, pool admin, reserve controls, fees
• DefiLlama — HypurrFi Pooled survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: current TVL, borrowed amount, Hyperliquid L1 perimeter, Lending category

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.