Linx App

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

Linx App’s surveyed product is isolated overcollateralized lending on Alephium: lenders supply one loan asset, borrowers post a separate collateral asset, and liquidators repay unhealthy debt for collateral. That is lending rather than AMM-LP inventory. The only surveyed deployment is on Alephium, which has not passed Ketju chain review, so the shared version-1 rejected-chain dossier controls before the separate approximately $0.060M size, market, oracle, liquidation, audit and exit questions.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Alephium passes a versioned Ketju chain review
• Linx launches a material independently verified deployment on an approved chain

The research file

Mechanism and product perimeter

Linx creates an independent subcontract for each collateral-token and loan-token market. Lenders supply only the loan asset and earn utilization-based interest; borrowers deposit collateral and borrow up to an immutable LLTV; liquidators repay debt and seize discounted collateral after LTV crosses LLTV. The depositor is not supplying a two-asset AMM position, so the prior amm-lp basis was false.

Deployment, authority and measurement

The DefiLlama adapter discovers market-created events from the Linx factory at vQcfta4Mm32L7Xsb7tYF2rrR76JWxjNv3oia8GPK6x71, then counts each market’s collateral plus idle loan tokens and separately reports borrowed loan assets. The 2026-08-16 API read showed approximately $59,968 of TVL and $21,923 borrowed, exclusively on Alephium. Permissionless market creation is bounded by immutable collateral, loan token, LLTV, oracle and protocol-approved IRM parameters, but users still must underwrite each market rather than the aggregate app label.

Oracle, liquidation, audit and exit applicability

Market creators choose an immutable oracle from an oracle-agnostic interface and an approved IRM; the documentation warns users to verify source, staleness, scaling and audit history. Withdrawals require idle loan liquidity, while collateral volatility, interest accrual, oracle failure or failed liquidation can create bad debt. Inference AG published a Linx-on-Alephium assessment, but an audit does not establish every permissionlessly created market, asset, oracle, utilization state or proposed-size exit.

Why the chain dossier decides

All currently investable Linx lending markets and every measured balance settle on Alephium. No approved-chain deployment offers the same surveyed client claim without that settlement dependency. The shared version-1 rejected-chain dossier therefore controls. Reopen only if Alephium passes a versioned Ketju chain review or Linx launches a material independently verified approved-chain deployment; then inspect exact markets, contracts, assets, LLTVs, oracles, IRMs, utilization, bad debt, audit scope and proposed-size withdrawals.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• Linx Docs — isolated lending markets · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: Alephium subcontracts, single-asset supply, collateralized borrowing, immutable parameters, permissionless markets, withdrawal liquidity
• Linx Docs — oracle architecture · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: oracle-agnostic design, immutable oracle, price risk, user due diligence
• Linx Docs — liquidations · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: LLTV, health factor, liquidation process, oracle failure, bad-debt protection
• Inference AG — Linx on Alephium assessment · primary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: audit scope, Alephium contracts, security findings
• DefiLlama — Linx adapter · secondary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: factory address, market discovery, TVL accounting, borrowed accounting, Alephium-only perimeter
• DefiLlama — Linx survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-16
  Supports: current TVL, current borrowed balance, Alephium perimeter, Lending category

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.