Mento V3

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

Mento V3 is the exchange layer behind Celo’s multi-currency stablecoins, now also deployed on Monad, swapping stable assets against reserve collateral through on-chain fixed-price market-maker pools. LPs add both reserve assets and receive pool shares; swaps and protocol rebalancers alter that inventory even though oracle prices replace a reserve-derived quote. This is still multi-asset market making and matches the v1 AMM-LP dossier. The August 15, 2026 survey reported about $3.91M across Celo and Monad.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Ships a product line without impermanent-loss exposure that merits its own review

The research file

Mechanism applicability

Mento V3 FPMMs are oracle-priced pools rather than classic reserve-priced AMMs, but they still mint LP shares against two-token deposits and burn those shares for pool reserves. Mento describes automated rebalancers that keep pools near a 50:50 balance, and its router exposes add, remove and zap operations. The client therefore retains changing multi-asset inventory while seeking fees or incentives, satisfying the economic scope of the shared v1 amm-lp dossier.

Current observation and lifecycle

The DefiLlama API read on 2026-08-15 classified Mento V3 as a DEX, measured tokens held in FPMM pools, and reported approximately $3.91M across Celo and Monad. Mento reported that V3 FPMMs shipped in March 2026 and replaced V2-style swaps, while current deployment pages list live pools and liquidity-strategy contracts on both chains. This is an active current-version record.

Control, loss and exit applicability

Each pool executes at an external oracle rate less fees, with governance-configured validity checks, market-hour gates, trading limits and circuit breakers. Bad or stale prices can transfer value from the pool before a breaker reacts, and rebalancers change reserve composition. Removing liquidity returns the current two-token mix or uses a zap that adds swap execution; neither path guarantees the original asset quantities, and halted trading or limits can constrain a single-asset exit.

Why the class rule decides

Replacing the constant-product quote with an oracle does not turn an LP share into single-asset lending: the provider still funds both sides of trading and bears path-dependent inventory. The shared v1 amm-lp dossier therefore controls. Reopen only for a distinct Mento product whose client return does not depend on pool shares, paired inventory, rebalancing or swap incentives, with asset backing, oracle controls and proposed-size exit separately underwritten on an approved chain.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• Mento — V3 FPMM launch and rebalancers · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: FPMM launch, Celo, Monad, 50:50 rebalancers, liquidity incentives, CDP distinction
• Mento — FPMM oracle and breaker mechanics · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: oracle-priced swaps, pool loss, stale price, trading limits, circuit breakers
• Mento — live V3 deployments · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: FPMM pools, Celo contracts, Monad contracts, liquidity strategies, governance controls
• ChainSecurity — Mento Core V3 assessment · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: LP share mint and burn, add liquidity, remove liquidity, zap exit, router controls
• DefiLlama — Mento V3 survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
  Supports: current TVL, Celo and Monad perimeter, DEX category, FPMM pool methodology

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.