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Sanctum Validator LSTs

Rejected
Max sleeve
Reviewed
2026-08-19 · v1
Next review
2026-11-19
Research basis
Individual research
Chains
Solana · crypto-backed

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

REJECTED. This entry is confirmed distinct from Sanctum Infinity, already rejected elsewhere in this registry: it is the aggregate of over 1,300 separate single- and multi-validator liquid staking tokens Sanctum has issued for individual brands and validators (Jupiter’s jupSOL, Bybit’s bbSOL, and hundreds of smaller, thinly-liquid tokens), each backed by its own on-chain stake pool rather than a diversified basket. Sanctum itself, not the named validator, holds day-to-day pool-management authority for every one of these tokens — a real, disclosed safeguard against a compromised validator stealing funds — but that same structure means a client evaluating ”Sanctum Validator LSTs” as a single entry cannot actually evaluate any specific position: the risk, liquidity, and validator quality differ token by token across well over a thousand separate pools. Sanctum’s own account of the 2025-10-11 market crash confirms ”some Solana LSTs began to depeg” that day while its diversified Infinity pool stabilized and even profited — direct evidence that individual validator LSTs are structurally more fragile under stress than a diversified pool, without naming which specific tokens depegged or by how much.

The research file

Mechanism and confirmed distinction from Sanctum Infinity

DefiLlama tracks this entry separately from sanctum-infinity, explicitly subtracting stake held inside Infinity to avoid double-counting — the two are deliberately distinct products sharing a parent brand. Each validator LST is minted by a Single or Multi Validator Stake Pool program, a fork of the standard Solana stake-pool program also used by Jito and Blaze. A brand or validator launches one through a business relationship with Sanctum — a branding form, team-managed deployment over a few days, and a one-time 100 SOL setup fee for a ”Sanctum Branded LST” — not a permissionless, self-service process. Default economics are a 0.1% withdrawal fee plus 10% of staking yield split between the operator and Sanctum.

Control is centralized in Sanctum, not the named validator

Sanctum’s own documentation states plainly that day-to-day pool management — staking deposited SOL, setting up each LST — is held by Sanctum, and that this authority ”cannot steal your funds, even if compromised,” with fee changes capped and delayed with advance warning. Program-level upgrade authority sits with an 11-member multisig including Jupiter, Jito, Sol Strategies, Solblaze, and Sanctum, requiring majority approval for any change. This is a genuinely disclosed, reasonably safeguarded control structure — the rejection here rests on aggregation and liquidity risk, not on an undisclosed admin-key concern.

The aggregation problem

Because each branded LST is its own stake pool tied to its own validator or small validator set, a single validator’s downtime or misconduct affects only that LST’s holders directly — but the DefiLlama entry this memo covers bundles well over 1,300 such pools into one TVL figure with no way to evaluate any individual one from the aggregate. A client cannot meaningfully diligence ”Sanctum Validator LSTs” as a single position; they would need to diligence one specific validator’s pool, its liquidity, and its operator quality, which this entry does not and cannot do for them.

Shared, finite liquidity backstop

Instant redemption liquidity for these LSTs depends on Sanctum’s shared Reserve and Infinity pool — described by Sanctum as ”last resort liquidity” of a few hundred thousand SOL — a common resource across all validator LSTs, not a validator-specific buffer. A run on one thin, long-tail validator LST during a stress event could exhaust its share of that shared liquidity faster than a large, diversified LST like INF would be affected, even though each pool’s underlying stake claim is technically isolated from the others.

The October 2025 stress event and comparison

Sanctum’s own blog debrief of the 2025-10-11 market-wide liquidation event states that ”some Solana LSTs began to depeg” as demand for unstaked SOL spiked, while its diversified Infinity pool stabilized prices and earned an elevated yield by unstaking roughly 300,000 SOL from reserves — without naming which specific validator LSTs depegged or by how much. That asymmetry, a diversified pool weathering the stress while unnamed individual LSTs did not, is direct evidence supporting a harder line against single-validator LST exposure than against a diversified alternative. Against Jito Liquid Staking (a single large diversified pool) or Marinade Native and Select (both diversified delegation, separately researched in this batch), this entry’s structural fragmentation into thousands of individually-undiligenceable pools is a materially different and worse risk shape.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.

ChainVerdictGradeControl constraint
SolanaApproved · limits crypto-backed no admin key can seize funds, but stake concentration and a sub-25 Nakamoto coefficient are the standing watch items.
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