Silo V2
Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.
Silo V2 runs permissionless lending markets where each asset pair is isolated, so a bad asset in one market cannot drain the others. The August 15, 2026 survey reported about $5.71M of supplied assets across Avalanche, Sonic, Ethereum and Arbitrum, plus about $2.47M separately tagged as borrowed. The survey maps permissionless isolated markets, not a curator-managed vault wrapper, so no more fundamental existing dossier is shown; the live protocol remains governed by the v1 below-materiality rule.
- TVL sustained above $100M for 30 days
The research file
Applicability to the surveyed record
Silo V2 consists of permissionless, risk-isolated lending pairs with two immutable asset silos per market. A direct supplier chooses the named market and earns borrower interest while inheriting that market’s collateral, oracle, interest-rate and liquidation configuration. DefiLlama derives this slug from Silo factory contracts and sums deposited assets, supporting direct-lending rather than delegated-vault classification.
Current observation and perimeter
The DefiLlama API read on 2026-08-15 classified Silo V2 as Lending and reported approximately $5.71M TVL across Avalanche, Sonic, Ethereum and Arbitrum, with roughly $2.47M separately tagged as borrowed. Official deployment materials still list V2 markets alongside newer V3, so the record is live rather than archived, but remains far below the shared v1 $100M threshold.
Control, loss and exit applicability
Anyone can deploy a V2 market, and isolation limits contagion without proving that a chosen pair is safe. Suppliers inherit borrower utilization and collateral, oracle and liquidation failure; a Silo risk report warns that bad pricing can produce losses despite isolation. Withdrawal burns the lending receipt for the underlying and depends on available liquidity when supplied assets have been borrowed.
Why the class rule decides
The shared v1 below-materiality dossier controls this factory-level direct-lending record. Reopen after reproducible TVL remains at least $100M for 30 days, then underwrite a named market rather than the aggregate slug: collateral and debt assets, oracle and immutable parameters, deployer and hooks, utilization, bad debt, audit scope, incident history, and proposed-size withdrawal liquidity. A separate managed-vault product would require the delegated-allocation test.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Silo — V2 security and mechanism review · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: V2 isolated pairs, permissionless deployment, immutable silos, security scope - Silo — V2 market risk example · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: V2 isolation, permissionless markets, oracle loss, liquidation, market-specific risk - Silo — deployments and live V2 perimeter · primary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: V2 markets, contract deployments, lifecycle - DefiLlama — Silo V2 survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-15
Supports: current TVL, borrowed value, four-chain perimeter, factory methodology, Lending category
Inherited controls
The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.
| Chain | Verdict | Grade | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avalanche | Approved · limits | crypto-backed | no party can freeze or seize C-Chain funds, but one vendor writes the only production client and Messari measured over a third of stake hosted on AWS. |
| Ethereum | Approved | sovereign | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus. |
| Arbitrum One | Approved · limits | hybrid | a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock. |