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Suilend

Rejected
Max sleeve
Reviewed
2026-08-19 · v1
Next review
2026-11-19
Research basis
Individual research
Chains
Sui · freezable

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

REJECTED ON AN UNDISCLOSED LEGAL ENTITY AND AN UNQUANTIFIED PAST BAD-DEBT EVENT. Suilend, built by the team behind Solana’s Save (formerly Solend), is a live, growing, genuinely Aave-like overcollateralized lending market on Sui with real security investment: Zellic and OtterSec audits from its March 2024 launch and an active $250,000 bug bounty. But no legal entity name or incorporation jurisdiction was found anywhere in Suilend’s documentation or accessible terms — a genuine disclosure gap this registry does not waive for an otherwise well-regarded product. More consequentially, Suilend’s own documentation acknowledges ”in the past, bad debt in main pool has been filled via top-ups from the Insurance fund” — a real, admitted loss event this review could not date, size, or otherwise verify from any source, which is not the same as a confirmed clean or bounded track record.

The research file

Mechanism

Suilend runs a standard overcollateralized lending market on Sui: users supply assets to shared pools and borrow against posted collateral up to a loan-to-value threshold, with utilization-responsive interest curves and liquidation of undercollateralized positions, priced via Pyth and Switchboard oracles. The broader Suilend brand has expanded beyond lending into SpringSui (liquid staking) and STEAMM (an automated market maker, beta since February 2025), meaning ”Suilend” now spans several distinct products under one brand — this memo covers the core lending market specifically.

The undisclosed legal entity

No legal-entity name, jurisdiction of incorporation, or governing-law clause was found in Suilend’s documentation or in any reachable terms-of-service page — both attempted paths returned not-found errors. This is a real gap this registry requires closed before certifying a position, independent of the product’s otherwise reasonable technical and audit disclosure.

The unquantified bad-debt admission

Suilend’s own documentation states plainly that ”in the past, bad debt in main pool has been filled via top-ups from the Insurance fund” — confirming at least one loss event has occurred and was covered by a protocol reserve rather than falling on depositors directly. No date, dollar amount, cause, or dedicated post-mortem was found for this event in any source this review could access. An insurance-fund backstop that has already been drawn upon is a meaningfully different risk profile than one that has never been tested, and this registry cannot certify a position without knowing how large the event was or how close the fund came to being exhausted.

Control and redemption

Governance is stated to be transitioning to a Suilend DAO gated by the SEND token, launched December 2024, with two DAO-controlled addresses referenced in documentation whose current authority scope — whether they can already pause markets or adjust risk parameters, or only will be able to in a future governance state — was not resolved from available sources. Redemption follows standard Aave-style mechanics: liquidity-dependent withdrawal capped by a given pool’s available, unborrowed supply.

Track record and comparison

Mainnet launched March 2024; the SEND token in December 2024; STEAMM entered beta in February 2025. Zellic and OtterSec audited the core protocol in March 2024, and Suilend runs an active $250,000 critical-vulnerability bug bounty. Tracked TVL is consistent with an actively growing, currently live market — the opposite trajectory from Homora V2, researched alongside this entry and confirmed dead. Against Aave and Compound, Suilend is architecturally a like-for-like peer differentiated mainly by chain (Sui’s Move-based object model rather than the EVM) and by a shorter, roughly 2.5-year live history against which to weigh the undisclosed entity and the admitted bad-debt event above.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.

ChainVerdictGradeControl constraint
SuiRejected freezable freeze and seizure are demonstrated: standing validator deny lists began freezing the Cetus exploiter’s ~$162M within about 80 minutes, and a Foundation-organized vote later moved the frozen funds without the owner’s keys.
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