SUNSwap V3

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

SUNSwap V3 is rejected under the version-1 AMM-liquidity-provision dossier. The Phase 2 survey measured approximately $225.3M on Tron. SUNSwap V3 uses concentrated-liquidity positions: an LP chooses a price interval, earns fees only while active, and can finish entirely in one asset after a large relative-price move. This is a protocol-specific application of a published class rule, not an unsupported claim that every contract or operator behind SUNSwap V3 is defective.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• SUNSwap ships a single-asset product with no impermanent-loss exposure
• A client mandate explicitly authorizes concentrated-liquidity market making with defined range and loss controls

The research file

Mechanism and applicability

SUNSwap V3 uses concentrated-liquidity positions: an LP chooses a price interval, earns fees only while active, and can finish entirely in one asset after a large relative-price move. The reviewed deployment therefore satisfies the dossier’s mechanism requirements on its own facts. The Phase 2 survey measured approximately $225.3M on Tron. A class application records enough protocol evidence to prove applicability while leaving the shared economic argument in the pinned dossier rather than pretending this is a separate flagship review.

Control and incident boundary

SUN governance, contract administration, token issuers, and the separately rejected Tron settlement layer add controls beyond the AMM mechanism; none converts the LP claim into single-asset lending. Those controls and the available incident record may change operational risk, but they do not remove the property that triggers this disposition. No clean-record claim is used as proof of safety: a young deployment can have little adversarial history, and an established deployment can execute its intended economics without an exploit while still remaining unsuitable for the advised sleeve.

Exit and current measurement

Withdrawal removes the position at its current range inventory and can return a materially different asset mix from the deposit; out-of-range positions stop earning trading fees. Aggregate TVL is an accounting measure rather than a promise that the exact client position can be unwound at the displayed value. The disposition remains a zero allocation until a stated reopen condition is observed and a new review measures the proposed-size exit instead of inferring it from a dashboard total.

Comparison and decision

A reviewed single-asset yield claim avoids both the LP inventory transfer and the inherited Tron control concentration. The comparison is made at the exposure level, not by brand or headline rate. The published dossier is preferable to repeating the same class judgment with slightly different wording for every venue; the protocol-specific sources retained here make the classification reproducible and the reopen criteria observable.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• SUN.io Documentation — SUNSwap V3 overview · primary · accessed 2026-08-19
  Supports: concentrated liquidity, price ranges, fee mechanism
• DefiLlama — SUNSwap V3 protocol data · secondary · accessed 2026-08-19
  Supports: protocol category, chain perimeter, current TVL

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.