Veda
Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.
Veda is infrastructure for partner-branded vaults whose curators dynamically route assets across lending, staking, DEX and other strategies. DefiLlama recorded about $1.40B on 2026-08-14, so the inherited below-materiality basis was false. The correct disposition is delegated allocation: Merkle allowlists constrain what a strategist may call, but the depositor still accepts future allocation choices and every permitted underlying venue. This is a class application, not a finding that Veda is unsafe.
- A named vault publishes a static mandate with complete exposure caps, authorities, loss accounting and stressed-exit evidence suitable for individual review
The research file
Mechanism
A depositor receives BoringVault shares through a Teller at an exchange rate published by an Accountant. A curator proposes rebalances and a strategist executes them through a Manager; Merkle proofs and decoder contracts restrict calls to pre-authorized targets and parameters. Veda documents allocations to venues such as Aave, Morpho and Euler and says assets remain onchain.
Control and operating record
The curator determines strategy and exposure within the allowlist, the strategist operates the vault, and configurable modules govern accounting, locks and exits. Veda publishes a long audit list covering the core vault, Teller, Accountant, queue, solver and integrations and states that the architecture has operated at billion-dollar scale without a security incident. That is issuer-reported evidence, not an independently verified no-loss finding.
Exit consequences
Some deployments maintain an instant-withdrawal buffer. Otherwise a holder sends shares to BoringQueue, waits through a configurable maturity period, and depends on a third-party solver to deliver the requested asset; an unfilled request can be cancelled for the shares. Exit timing and value therefore depend on the current strategy mix, unwind liquidity, queue settings and reported exchange rate.
Why the class rule decides
Veda is explicitly built to let a curator change allocations after deposit. Onchain custody and call constraints reduce operational risk but do not give this advisory program control over which approved strategy is live or prevent inheritance of an underlying venue we reject. Review reopens for a named, static-mandate vault whose complete allowlist, caps, authorities, loss accounting and stressed exit can be underwritten separately.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Veda Docs — architecture and flow of funds · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: vault share mechanism, curator-directed rebalancing, onchain assets, withdrawal queue - Veda Docs — core components and Manager constraints · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: strategist authority, Manager controls, withdrawal queue - Veda Docs — audits · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: published security reviews, audit scope, integration reviews - DefiLlama — Veda survey record · secondary · accessed 2026-08-14
Supports: survey TVL, chains, protocol category
Inherited controls
The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.
| Chain | Verdict | Grade | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Approved | sovereign | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus. |
| Plasma | Rejected | freezable | the production validator committee is permissioned and the public docs still describe decentralization as a phased future rollout with no fixed access timeline. |