Yearn Finance

Rejected venues wait the longest for re-review; a rejection has to earn another look before the scheduled date.

Yearn V3 vaults are ERC-4626 allocators that assign debt across separately deployed strategies. Role holders can add or revoke strategies, set debt and reorder withdrawals. That is capable infrastructure, but the depositor delegates the venue mix and inherits every underlying risk. The delegated-allocation rule—not an individual security rejection—is dispositive.

Kill criteria: the events that revoke this verdict
• Publishes allocator mandates, curator accountability, and per-vault disclosure that let the delegation be underwritten

The research file

Mechanism

A V3 vault accounts for idle assets plus debt assigned to strategies. Authorized roles add strategies, set and update debt, process reports and maintain the withdrawal queue. The share therefore represents a changing portfolio rather than one fixed underlying exposure.

Control and operating evidence

The reference contract defines granular ADD, REVOKE, DEBT, QUEUE, REPORTING, ACCOUNTANT and emergency authorities. Yearn governance delegates constrained operations to multisigs, and ChainSecurity reviewed the V3 vault contracts. Those controls reduce implementation risk but do not create a client-specific mandate or fiduciary duty.

Exit consequences

Withdrawals use idle funds and then strategies in queue order. If a strategy cannot return funds promptly, is loss-bearing or reaches a configured loss limit, execution can fail or realize less than expected. Exit quality therefore depends on the live allocation and queue at the moment of withdrawal.

Why the class rule decides

The advisor cannot enforce protocol-level exclusions when an allocator may add, remove or resize underlying venues. Outsourcing that choice also duplicates the advisor’s core allocation function. Review reopens for a vault with a bounded published mandate, accountable allocator, timely position disclosure, change notice and stressed wind-down evidence.

Sources

The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.

• Yearn V3 — reference vault contract and roles · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: reference vault contract, roles
• Yearn Governance — YIP-75 V3 launch · primary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: YIP-75 V3 launch
• Yearn Dev Docs — governance and operations · secondary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: governance, operations
• ChainSecurity — Yearn V3 Vaults audit · secondary · accessed 2026-08-14
  Supports: Yearn V3 Vaults audit

Inherited controls

The verdict above grades the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The least safe layer sets the position’s grade, and the position table names which one that is.