KETJU Research

← Eligibility files

Eligibility file · Note

deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA)

What the client owns
Variable-rate note of Open Market Factory Limited whose value tracks JAAA tokens, the shares of the Janus Henderson Anemoy AAA CLO Fund, which the note pool holds. Third-party synthetic: A note or swap that pays like the security and carries no rights in it.
Who may hold it
Not offered to US persons. First purchase $10,000. The pool sheet names “Non-US Persons and Entities” and a 10,000 USD minimum for subscribing through the Centrifuge vault. The wallet must first be made a member (KYC through [email protected]). Holding and transfer need no membership: under the token’s transfer hook, any wallet that is not frozen can receive it. A US person can therefore buy it on a DEX, although the sheet does not admit US investors.
Who can freeze or claw back
Ethereum: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Base: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Arbitrum: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
BSC: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x9aab…1147.
Solana: can freeze a holder, mint. An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Monad: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61.
Stellar: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, mint, change the code.
How a holder redeems
Redeem with the issuer in its window. Members redeem through the Centrifuge vault daily, for USDC or USDT at the published price; members can also deposit JAAA into the vault. Settles in USDC, USDT.

This file replaced an earlier version on 2026-09-30. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file. Earlier versions.

Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program and whether each household qualifies under these terms, and Ketju emails them when the file changes. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free.

The verdict is on the memo: deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA) Not approved

Issuer
Open Market Factory Limited, issuer of the OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes (domicile and offering document not published); issued through Centrifuge’s deRWA program; Janus Henderson and Anemoy are not the issuer
Registration
Other
Official record
No transfer agent
Instruments
deJAAA
Chains
Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Avalanche, BSC, Monad, Solana, Stellar
Reviewed
2026-09-30
Next review
2027-03-30

Eligibility

Each answer quotes the issuer’s own words from the document named under it. Ketju reads each document again and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row states that.

What the holder owns

A note of Open Market Factory Limited that gives exposure to JAAA tokens. The holder owns no JAAA share and has no claim on Janus Henderson or Anemoy.

“The OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes offer exposure to the underlying JAAA Tokens”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.issuer.description · words found 2026-09-23

Who may hold it

The pool sheet admits non-US persons and entities, but any wallet that is not frozen can hold the token itself.

“Non-US Persons and Entities”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Eligibility · words found 2026-09-23

First purchase minimum

10,000 USD to subscribe through the vault; none to buy on a DEX.

“10,000 USD”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Min. investment · words found 2026-09-23

Account types

Individuals and entities outside the United States.

“Non-US Persons and Entities”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.investorType · words found 2026-09-23

Who it may be transferred to

Freely transferable to any wallet that is not frozen.

“a freely transferable, fully onchain instrument linked to JAAA”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Overview · words found 2026-09-23

How a holder redeems

Daily through the Centrifuge vault for members; any time on DEXes for everyone else.

“Daily via vault; tradable 24/7 on DEXes”

Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Liquidity · words found 2026-09-23

Who keeps the official record

The documents we read do not state which record governs the notes or who keeps it.

Not stated in Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain, Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks), Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (read from the Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11), Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20, read from the Internet Archive copy).

What the issuer says it can freeze or take back

Centrifuge, the platform, states that frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens; the note issuer does not say so.

“Account freezing - frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens”

Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks) · Token compliance, Architecture · words found 2026-09-23

FactAnswer
Who onboards the holderissuer
Voting rightsNone
Distributionsreinvested
SIPC coverage of the walletNo

Who controls it

Ketju read these powers from the deployed contracts and their verified source code: the token and every contract it checks on a transfer. A power listed here is something the issuer can do; it does not mean the issuer has used it.

ChainFreeze a holderPauseClaw backGate holdersChange the codeKeys held by
EthereumYesNoYesNoYesA contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
BaseYesNoYesNoYesA contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
ArbitrumYesNoYesNoYesA contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
BSCYesNoYesNoYestransfer hook 0x9aab…1147
SolanaYesNoNoNoNoAn account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder.
AvalancheYesNoYesNoYesA contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
MonadYesNoYesNoYestransfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61
StellarYesYesNoNoYesGAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK via mint_from

Who holds the keys

Ketju read every current holder of each power from the chain on 2026-09-30. A single key is one private key, and whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock delays every action, so holders can see it before it takes effect.

ChainKeyWhat it can doHeld byAddress
EthereumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
EthereumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0xec35…25ab
EthereumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0x12a1…f43e
EthereumHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
EthereumHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa contract0xec35…25ab
BaseWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
BaseWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0xec35…25ab
BaseWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0x12a1…f43e
BaseHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
BaseHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa contract0xec35…25ab
ArbitrumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
ArbitrumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0xec35…25ab
ArbitrumWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0x12a1…f43e
ArbitrumHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
ArbitrumHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa contract0xec35…25ab
SolanaMint authoritymint new tokensan account only a program can sign forFBH7oW…Z66s
SolanaFreeze authorityfreeze a holderan account only a program can sign forFkPfY4…E15d
AvalancheWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
AvalancheWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0xec35…25ab
AvalancheWardgrant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may holda contract0x12a1…f43e
AvalancheHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa timelock with a 2-day delay0x7ed4…368f
AvalancheHook wardgrant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokensa contract0xec35…25ab

Ketju could not read the role holders on BSC, Monad, Stellar from the public event indexes on its last check. The table shows only what Ketju confirmed.

Ethereum: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
Read from verified source
Base: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
Read from verified source
Arbitrum: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
Read from verified source
BSC: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
Read from verified source
Solana: 2 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
Read from the chain
  • mintAuthority=FBH7oWjXHXyUaj1wQFCvivbo95BMEXc3QuUaYzayZ66s
  • freezeAuthority=FkPfY4i1zxHV5hepumE1c7GPXhpWhv3uYNgX2XRhE15d
Avalanche: 7 contract reads, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
Read from the chain
  • totalSupply()=0x000000000000000000000000000000e180681279
  • decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
  • eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
Read from verified source
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
  • abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Monad: 9 contract reads, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
Read from the chain
  • totalSupply()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
  • eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
  • hook()=0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61
  • hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
  • codehash(0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062)=0x7a690cd1827d39a5081bb79eb527a2de7d86b0cb23dd4aa6f3d074db8109e2a3=codehash(1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc)
  • codehash(0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61)=0xcdfff1ca7526880041d2a7378e1fc700fafbc4496e9a7c62f93d0b7e71a61423=codehash(1:0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147)
Read from verified source
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
  • abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Stellar: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-30
Read from the chain
  • wasm=d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb
  • get_admin()=GAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK
Read from verified source
  • abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#block_user
  • abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#pause
  • abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#mint_from
  • abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#upgrade

Where it trades

VenueKind
Centrifuge deRWA vault (pool 281474976710659)issuer primary
Aerodrome and other DEX poolsdex

Redemption

RouteSettlementSettles in
Redeem with the issuer in its windowMembers redeem through the Centrifuge vault daily, for USDC or USDT at the published price; members can also deposit JAAA into the vaultUSDC, USDT
Secondary market only; no issuer redemptionDEX pools (Aerodrome on Base among them) and Morpho lending markets, open to any wallet that is not frozenUSDC

Daily checks

Every day Ketju reads each control function in the table above and the contracts the token checks on a transfer. Ketju compares the token’s on-chain supply with yesterday’s, and its market quote with yesterday’s quote, since a fund of this kind accrues a few basis points a day. Ketju also reads every document quoted above and reviews the file again if a quoted passage disappears from its document. Ketju counts a new, removed, or changed key as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change since yesterday. If the log does not show it, Ketju updates the key list in this file and does nothing more. A change opens a review before any client action. Subscribers get an email that names each of their clients who hold the token, with the household result.

File history

Ketju has revised this file 2 times since filing it. Ketju keeps each earlier version as published, with the reason for the change.

DateChange
2026-09-23Filed.
2026-09-27Revised. Superseded to add control readings on chains the file listed without one, so a wallet holding the token there matches the file and the daily watch reads it. The terms and the claim model did not change.
2026-09-30Revised. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file.

Sources

Every file is public. With a subscription, Ketju checks each of your households against the file and checks the file every day. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free. Start the trial.