deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA)
Base: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Arbitrum: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
BSC: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x9aab…1147.
Solana: can freeze a holder, mint. An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder.
Avalanche: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay.
Monad: can freeze a holder, claw back, mint, change the code. Keys: transfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61.
Stellar: can freeze a holder, pause transfers, mint, change the code.
This file replaced an earlier version on 2026-09-30. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file. Earlier versions.
Subscribers see which of their clients hold this program and whether each household qualifies under these terms, and Ketju emails them when the file changes. $299 per firm per month, first 30 days free.
The verdict is on the memo: deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA) Not approved
Eligibility
Each answer quotes the issuer’s own words from the document named under it. Ketju reads each document again and records whether the words are still there. Where the documents say nothing, the row states that.
- What the holder owns
A note of Open Market Factory Limited that gives exposure to JAAA tokens. The holder owns no JAAA share and has no claim on Janus Henderson or Anemoy.
“The OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes offer exposure to the underlying JAAA Tokens”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.issuer.description · words found 2026-09-23
- Who may hold it
The pool sheet admits non-US persons and entities, but any wallet that is not frozen can hold the token itself.
“Non-US Persons and Entities”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Eligibility · words found 2026-09-23
- First purchase minimum
10,000 USD to subscribe through the vault; none to buy on a DEX.
“10,000 USD”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Min. investment · words found 2026-09-23
- Account types
Individuals and entities outside the United States.
“Non-US Persons and Entities”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · pool.investorType · words found 2026-09-23
- Who it may be transferred to
Freely transferable to any wallet that is not frozen.
“a freely transferable, fully onchain instrument linked to JAAA”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Overview · words found 2026-09-23
- How a holder redeems
Daily through the Centrifuge vault for members; any time on DEXes for everyone else.
“Daily via vault; tradable 24/7 on DEXes”
Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · Key facts, Liquidity · words found 2026-09-23
- Who keeps the official record
The documents we read do not state which record governs the notes or who keeps it.
Not stated in Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain, Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks), Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (read from the Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11), Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20, read from the Internet Archive copy).
- What the issuer says it can freeze or take back
Centrifuge, the platform, states that frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens; the note issuer does not say so.
“Account freezing - frozen addresses cannot send or receive tokens”
Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks) · Token compliance, Architecture · words found 2026-09-23
| Fact | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who onboards the holder | issuer |
| Voting rights | None |
| Distributions | reinvested |
| SIPC coverage of the wallet | No |
Who controls it
Ketju read these powers from the deployed contracts and their verified source code: the token and every contract it checks on a transfer. A power listed here is something the issuer can do; it does not mean the issuer has used it.
| Chain | Freeze a holder | Pause | Claw back | Gate holders | Change the code | Keys held by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Base | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Arbitrum | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| BSC | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | transfer hook 0x9aab…1147 |
| Solana | Yes | No | No | No | No | An account only a program can sign for can freeze a holder. |
| Avalanche | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | A contract can claw back tokens and freeze a holder. A contract can change the code with no delay. |
| Monad | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | transfer hook 0x2a9b…1a61 |
| Stellar | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | GAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK via mint_from |
Who holds the keys
Ketju read every current holder of each power from the chain on 2026-09-30. A single key is one private key, and whoever holds it acts alone. A multisig needs the stated number of signers. A timelock delays every action, so holders can see it before it takes effect.
| Chain | Key | What it can do | Held by | Address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Ethereum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Ethereum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Base | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Base | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Arbitrum | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Arbitrum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Arbitrum | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Solana | Mint authority | mint new tokens | an account only a program can sign for | FBH7oW…Z66s |
| Solana | Freeze authority | freeze a holder | an account only a program can sign for | FkPfY4…E15d |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
| Avalanche | Ward | grant and revoke these powers, claw back tokens, mint new tokens, change the code, decide who may hold | a contract | 0x12a1…f43e |
| Avalanche | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a timelock with a 2-day delay | 0x7ed4…368f |
| Avalanche | Hook ward | grant and revoke these powers, freeze a holder, claw back tokens | a contract | 0xec35…25ab |
Ketju could not read the role holders on BSC, Monad, Stellar from the public event indexes on its last check. The table shows only what Ketju confirmed.
Ethereum: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Base: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Arbitrum: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
BSC: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- freeze in verified source 0x9aab…1147
- authTransferFrom in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- mint in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
- file in verified source 0xaaa0…82cc
Solana: 2 contract reads, 0 functions in verified source, 2026-09-23
- mintAuthority=FBH7oWjXHXyUaj1wQFCvivbo95BMEXc3QuUaYzayZ66s
- freezeAuthority=FkPfY4i1zxHV5hepumE1c7GPXhpWhv3uYNgX2XRhE15d
Avalanche: 7 contract reads, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
- totalSupply()=0x000000000000000000000000000000e180681279
- decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
- eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- hook()=0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
- abi:routescan:43114:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Monad: 9 contract reads, 9 functions in verified source, 2026-09-27
- totalSupply()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- decimals()=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000012
- eip1967.implementation=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.admin=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- eip1967.beacon=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- hook()=0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61
- hook().checkERC20Transfer(dead,dead)=true
- codehash(0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062)=0x7a690cd1827d39a5081bb79eb527a2de7d86b0cb23dd4aa6f3d074db8109e2a3=codehash(1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc)
- codehash(0x2a9b9c14851baf7ad19f26607c9171ca1e7a1a61)=0xcdfff1ca7526880041d2a7378e1fc700fafbc4496e9a7c62f93d0b7e71a61423=codehash(1:0x9aab592cae455afb6fc78c922f9212bc2a4f1147)
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.FREEZE_BIT
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.freeze
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.isSourceOrTargetFrozen
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.unfreeze
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#authTransferFrom
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#hook.onERC20AuthTransfer
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#mint
- abi:twin:143:0x5f8a1c74c112865bd05dbe4752c7608332719062=1:0xaaa0008c8cf3a7dca931adaf04336a5d808c82cc#file
Stellar: 2 contract reads, 4 functions in verified source, 2026-09-30
- wasm=d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb
- get_admin()=GAZ4HCTWWUAMVV5RXMUARAO3CGJYA77DTKPOXF45BOXSOG6CJ2L4CWIK
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#block_user
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#pause
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#mint_from
- abi:soroban:d07941bef95ad91e9e5f64fa1ecfad57ca7aacf1cc3cd0e54f1dfa0859b0f6fb#upgrade
Where it trades
| Venue | Kind |
|---|---|
| Centrifuge deRWA vault (pool 281474976710659) | issuer primary |
| Aerodrome and other DEX pools | dex |
Redemption
| Route | Settlement | Settles in |
|---|---|---|
| Redeem with the issuer in its window | Members redeem through the Centrifuge vault daily, for USDC or USDT at the published price; members can also deposit JAAA into the vault | USDC, USDT |
| Secondary market only; no issuer redemption | DEX pools (Aerodrome on Base among them) and Morpho lending markets, open to any wallet that is not frozen | USDC |
- Open Market Factory Limited publishes the note terms or an offering document; Ketju then reviews the file again for what the holder owns, who may hold, the domicile, and who keeps the register
- The deJAAA hook changes from FreelyTransferable, or a freeze or authTransferFrom is used against a holder
- The note pool’s JAAA holdings, as shown by the Chronicle proof of asset, fall below the value of deJAAA outstanding
- Verified ABIs for Avalanche or Monad become available; Ketju then adds those chains
- JAAA itself changes its redemption terms, gates, or portfolio rules
Daily checks
Every day Ketju reads each control function in the table above and the contracts the token checks on a transfer. Ketju compares the token’s on-chain supply with yesterday’s, and its market quote with yesterday’s quote, since a fund of this kind accrues a few basis points a day. Ketju also reads every document quoted above and reviews the file again if a quoted passage disappears from its document. Ketju counts a new, removed, or changed key as a change only when the chain’s own log shows the grant, revocation, or signer change since yesterday. If the log does not show it, Ketju updates the key list in this file and does nothing more. A change opens a review before any client action. Subscribers get an email that names each of their clients who hold the token, with the household result.
File history
Ketju has revised this file 2 times since filing it. Ketju keeps each earlier version as published, with the reason for the change.
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-23 | Filed. |
| 2026-09-27 | Revised. Superseded to add control readings on chains the file listed without one, so a wallet holding the token there matches the file and the daily watch reads it. The terms and the claim model did not change. |
| 2026-09-30 | Revised. The file listed deJAAA on Stellar without a reading of who controls it: deJAAA there is a Soroban contract, which Ketju could not read. This version adds that reading, so a client wallet holding deJAAA on Stellar now matches this file. |
Sources
- Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659), pinned by the pool on chain · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: issuer Open Market Factory Limited, OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes, Non-US Persons and Entities, 10,000 USD minimum, daily vault liquidity, Chronicle proof of asset, underlying pool 281474976710663 - Centrifuge pool metadata for the Janus Henderson AAA CLO Fund (pool 281474976710663) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: underlying fund, Anemoy Capital SPC Limited, non-US professional investors - Centrifuge Docs, full-text export (deployments and transfer hooks) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA contract addresses, freely transferable hook for deRWA, account freezing - Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (read from the Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: wrapping service, freely transferable tokens, no minimums or onboarding in savings apps - Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20, read from the Internet Archive copy) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA first deRWA asset, Aerodrome, Coinbase DEX, OKX, Bitget, Morpho - Verified FreelyTransferable hook on Ethereum (Blockscout) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: any non-frozen account may receive and transfer, membership only for deposit and redeem, freeze