deJAAA (Open Market Factory notes linked to JAAA)
Research, firm shelf, model-client eligibility, and advisor selection are recorded separately. The scheduled date is the outside bound; new evidence can reopen the file sooner.
deJAAA looks like a share of the Janus Henderson Anemoy AAA CLO Fund and trades under a name that says so. It is not one. The Centrifuge pool that issues it names the issuer as Open Market Factory Limited and the instrument as the “OMF Series 2 20-Year Variable Rate Tokenized Notes,” which “offer exposure to the underlying JAAA Tokens.” The pool holds JAAA, the permissioned fund share, and issues a note against it that anyone can hold. Centrifuge calls this format deRWA and sells it as a wrapping service for issuers. About 9.9 million deJAAA were outstanding on 2026-09-23, 8.9 million of them on Ethereum, at a price of $1.049. The holder’s claim is on Open Market Factory, not on the fund. No note terms, no domicile, and no offering document for Open Market Factory are public. The pool sheet admits “Non-US Persons and Entities” to subscribe, with a 10,000 USD minimum, but the token’s hook lets any wallet that is not frozen receive it, so the eligibility rule binds only at the vault. The assessment is adverse. A note from an undisclosed issuer on undisclosed terms is a worse holding than the fund share it tracks, and US persons are outside the stated class.
- Open Market Factory Limited publishes the note terms, its domicile, and an offering document that gives holders security over the JAAA the pool holds
- The deJAAA hook changes, or a freeze or authTransferFrom is used against a holder
- The Chronicle proof of asset shows the pool’s JAAA below deJAAA outstanding
- The note is opened to US persons under a published exemption
The research file
How a deRWA note works
JAAA is a share of Anemoy’s BVI fund that holds AAA-rated CLO tranches, sold to non-US professional investors with a 500,000 USDC minimum, and its token only moves between member wallets. deJAAA runs as a separate Centrifuge pool (281474976710659) whose metadata points to the JAAA pool as its underlying. Members of the deJAAA pool deposit USDC, USDT, or JAAA into its vaults and receive deJAAA; the pool uses the money to hold JAAA. The note’s price accretes with JAAA’s value; Chronicle publishes a proof-of-asset feed for it. Centrifuge’s launch post calls deJAAA “a freely transferable version” of the fund and lists Aerodrome, Coinbase’s DEX, OKX Wallet, Bitget Wallet, and Morpho as venues. The legal link between the note and the JAAA the pool holds is in terms that are not public: whether holders have security over the JAAA, rank ahead of other creditors of Open Market Factory, or can force a sale is unknown.
Who may hold
The pool sheet’s eligibility line reads “Non-US Persons and Entities,” and the vault minimum is 10,000 USD; KYC runs through [email protected]. The token itself runs Centrifuge’s FreelyTransferable hook, whose verified code “Allows any non-frozen account to receive tokens and transfer tokens” and asks for membership only to deposit or redeem. The reader asked the hook directly on 2026-09-23 whether an unlisted address could receive a transfer, and it said yes. So the stated class governs who may subscribe and redeem, not who may hold, and a US client can end up owning a note that its issuer says is not for US persons.
Who controls the token
On Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, and BSC the deJAAA token answers to Centrifuge’s Root (48-hour delay on Ethereum) and to the Spoke and BalanceSheet contracts that act on the pool manager’s instructions. Through them the pool can mint, move any balance with authTransferFrom, freeze a wallet on the hook, and replace the hook with file(), which could turn a freely transferable token into a restricted one. On Solana a program address holds the freeze authority; there is no permanent delegate. The Avalanche and Monad contracts have no verified code and Stellar is a Soroban contract, so those chains are not read.
Comparison and decision
Against JAAA itself, filed under the Centrifuge protocol memo, deJAAA gives up the fund share for a note of an unknown issuer, in exchange for DEX trading and a lower minimum. Against the synthetic stock wrappers in this registry, which at least publish a prospectus or base terms, it publishes none. CoinGecko’s name for it, “DeFi Janus Henderson Anemoy AAA CLO Fund,” is not the issuer’s and overstates the claim. The assessment is adverse, the program is excluded by policy because US persons are outside the stated class, and it is ineligible for model clients.
Sources
The claims above trace to these. Where a number could not be independently verified, the thesis says so.
- Centrifuge pool metadata for “JAAA deRWA” (pool 281474976710659) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: issuer Open Market Factory Limited, OMF Series 2 notes, Non-US Persons and Entities, 10,000 USD minimum, daily vault, 24/7 DEX, Chronicle proof of asset - Centrifuge pool metadata for the Janus Henderson AAA CLO Fund (pool 281474976710663) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: underlying fund, non-US professional investors - Centrifuge Docs, full-text export · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA addresses, freely transferable hook, account freezing - Centrifuge: deRWA Tokens (Internet Archive copy of 2026-05-11) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: wrapping service for issuers, freely transferable - Centrifuge: Centrifuge Brings deRWA to Millions on EVM (2025-08-20) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: deJAAA first deRWA asset, venues - Verified FreelyTransferable hook on Ethereum (Blockscout) · primary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: any non-frozen account may hold, membership for deposit and redeem only - CoinGecko: DeFi Janus Henderson Anemoy AAA CLO Fund · secondary · accessed 2026-09-23
Supports: listing name, $9.9M market cap
Inherited controls
The research above describes the protocol layer. Every position also inherits the asset it holds and the chain it settles on. The most administered layer sets the position’s effective control grade; that is a control description, not a quality or suitability score.
| Chain | Verdict | Grade | Control constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Favorable | sovereign | No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled — rule changes require social consensus. |
| Base | Favorable with conditions | hybrid | Coinbase — one regulated US company — operates the only sequencer, and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts within ~7 days. |
| Arbitrum One | Favorable with conditions | hybrid | a single sequencer orders >99% of transactions and admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a ~7-day timelock. |
| Avalanche | Favorable with conditions | crypto-backed | no party can freeze or seize C-Chain funds, but one vendor writes the only production client and Messari measured over a third of stake hosted on AWS. |
| BNB Smart Chain | Adverse | freezable | the validator set concentrates around one company, and the chain has been halted by decision. |
| Monad | Favorable with conditions | crypto-backed | the L1 has a public validator path, but its short production record, single initial client lineage, and Foundation-directed delegation keep stake and operations concentrated. |
| Solana | Favorable with conditions | crypto-backed | no admin key can seize funds, but stake concentration and a sub-25 Nakamoto coefficient are the standing watch items. |
| Stellar | Adverse | freezable | freeze is native at every level: issuers hold revocation and clawback flags on their assets, and since Protocol 26 the validator quorum can vote to freeze specific accounts and trustlines on-chain (CAP-77). |